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ABSTRACT 
Growth inequality is a pressing issue for Vietnam, one of the fastest-growing 
economies in Southeast Asia. This dissertation examines potential factors contributing 
to the regional economic growth disparities of Vietnam and their effects on the 
development process. The Extreme Bound Analysis approach was used for estimating 
growth equations to identify the robust determinants of the model. Using the data from 
42 provinces in Vietnam from 1998 to 2003, the analysis confirms the importance of 
good economic governance, initial GDP level, human capital, and population. The 
analysis suggests that provincial governance such as State Sector Bias and Proactivity 
of Provincial Leadership are robust and economically important factors related to 




Over the past few centuries, the world has seen unimaginable improvements in 
people’s standard of living. Average incomes today in the United States and Western 
Europe are between 10 and 30 times larger than a century ago, and between 50 and 
300 times larger than 2 centuries ago (Romer, 2005). 
At the same time, there are enormous differences in living standards across 
different parts of the world. The gap between industrialized and developing countries 
is getting wider reflecting large differences in human welfare, nutrition, literacy, infant 
mortality, life expectance, and other measurements of human well-being. Average real 
income in such countries as the United States, Germany, and Japan appear to exceed 
those in such countries as Bangladesh and Kenya by a factor of about 20 (Penn World 
Tables, 2007). While the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in the United 
States is $121 a day (World Fact Book, 2006), more than 314 million Africans live on 
less than $1 a day—nearly twice as many as in 1981 (World Bank, 2006). 
There are also vast differences among regions within nations. This 
phenomenon is common in both developed and developing countries. Conflicts arise 
between national growth and regional income equality, especially in rapidly growing 
economies like Korea (Renaud, 1973) and China (Jian, Sachs, & Warner, 1996; Ying, 
1999). Vietnam is not an exception. With a GDP growth rate of 8.2% in 2006, 
Vietnam is ranked among one of the fastest-growing economies in Southeast Asia and 
in the world. However, one of Vietnam’s current priorities is to address the growing 
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disparity in economic development between regions, and provinces within a single 
region.  
Per capita income, $220 in 1994, rose to $726 in 2006 with a related reduction 
in the share of the population living in acute poverty. In the meantime, regional 
differences in average annual income are wide: compared with $726 national average, 
it is $1,800 in Ho Chi Minh City and much lower than average in the poorer provinces 
of the central and northern highlands. Growth rates varied between regions and urban 
and rural areas. Nevertheless, positive per capita growth rates were recorded in most 
areas throughout the country. GDP growth was highest in the southeast, about 16%, 
and lowest in the Mekong Delta at 4%. Annual growth rates among the other regions 
ranged from 7% to 9% (Dollar & Litvack, 1998). Roughly 20% of the provinces (11 
out of 64) account for more than 60% growth in the private sector and more than 70% 
of both private-sector investment and revenue (Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative 
[VNCI], 2006). While state spending—a significant portion of GDP—is spread more 
evenly across regions and mitigates some of the differences in living standards in the 
near term, the data reflect a pattern of highly concentrated growth in a few areas, with 
much of the country lagging behind and displaying far less of the dynamism that 
would allow them to catch up.  
This dissertation’s investigates the question: What factors contribute to the 
regional growth disparities in Vietnam? This question is of great concern for the 
development process in Vietnam because the lagging regions tend to resist economic 
reform while successful regions tend to embrace it. If only part of the country is 
successful, it will be difficult to achieve a national consensus about moving ahead 
 3
quickly to integrate into the global economy, reform public administration, finances 
and other important issues. If some provinces continue to lag behind, it is likely that 
the overall pace of economic reform will suffer. This is, therefore, an urgent economic 
problem to solve for the long-term stable development of the country, to help these 
promising provinces better reach their potential. 
One hypothesis given for this striking difference is history. The northern area 
has long experience with old-style central planning, while the southern area has been 
exposed somewhat to the market economy. History does have some weight, but it is 
likely to diminish over time. Another reason suggested by Nguyen, Pham, Bui & 
Dapice (2004) is that better infrastructure in the south can be a primary reason for 
disparities. However, years of high investments have added important port facilities, 
highways, and better power and water supplies to the north. Industrial zones (IZs) are 
plentiful. Similarly, the cost of labor is higher in the south than in the north, so that 
should be a northern advantage. What elements in particular make some regions grow 
faster than the others? How much do they contribute to the overall rate of 
development? This research builds an economic model for the analysis of regional 
growth and assesses the effects of different factors on the economic-development 
process of provinces in Vietnam, ranging from infrastructure, to human capital, 
geographic location, business environment, and provincial governance. 
This regional-development research on Vietnam is interesting for several 
reasons. First, Vietnam has been subject to several distinctive policy regimes since the 
establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945. The country was 
divided into two parts: northern Vietnam and southern Vietnam after the Geneva 
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Peace Agreement was signed in 1954. The North was pursuing socialism with a 
central-planning economy under the support of the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
European Block. The South was pursuing capitalism under the influence and support 
of the United States. Although the country was reunified in 1975, the historical 
imprints are likely to have had considerable impact on the economic development of 
each region.  
Vietnam continued its “closed door” policy until 1986. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the country transformed from a central planning economy to a market 
economy “with a socialist orientation.” In this special case of transitional economic 
development, socialist and capitalistic elements of the economy coexist. A large 
proportion of businesses are state owned, and simultaneously there is booming private 
enterprise following the enactment of the Enterprise Law in 1999. This new law 
boldly changed the paradigm of creating a private business in Vietnam by making 
enterprise registration a legal right, rather than a privilege awarded at the discretion of 
local officials (Vu & Mazur, 2005). The Communist Party is still the ruling party with 
political power, but at the same time, market forces, entrepreneurs, and local officials 
have begun to have their voice in the policy-making process.  
A second historical artifact is that Vietnam displays vast geographical 
disparities in the sectoral distribution of economic activity, living standard, resource 
base, and other determinants of income level and income growth. These disparities 
increase the impact of regional inequality because the gaps between the richest and 
poorest regions, the urban and rural areas, are getting wider and wider. In 2002, 
monthly consumption was 460 thousand Vietnam Dong (VND) per capita in urban 
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and 211 thousand VND in rural areas, the northwest and north central coast were 
poorest (179/193 thousand VND) and the HCMC area the highest (448 thousand 
VND; General Statistics Office of Vietnam [GSO], 2005). 
Thirdly, the case of Vietnam regional development provides some important 
hints for economies with widening inequalities among its regions. Regional-
development equality has been a common concern for many policy makers in the 
world, especially in developing economies.  
This research analyzes 42 provinces of Vietnam from 1998 to 2003. It 
overviews the variation in the pace of economic development in the national economy. 
The data are collected from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO; 1996–
2006), the Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative (VNCI, 2005), the World Bank (1996–
2006), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1990, 2005, 2007).  
The Extreme Bound Analysis approach following Leamer (1983), Levine and 
Renelt (1992), Granger and Uhlig (1990), Poskitt and Tremayne (1987), and Reed 
(2006) is used to discover the robust variables among the various potential 
determinants in the growth equation. After purging the effects of nonrobust variables, 
the results confirm the effects of Initial GDP levels, Population, Human Capital, State 
Sector Bias, and Proactivity of Provincial Leadership to  provincial growth.  
The main contribution of this dissertation is to model economic and 
noneconomic effects on regional growth, as well as to guide policy makers seeking to 
promote more balanced economic development in the country. The data collection and 
analysis will also contribute to regional economic literature in Vietnam, and can be 
useful in further research on growth and development. 
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The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 will review different 
economic growth models from neoclassical to new-growth theory: the empirical 
studies on geography and economic growth. Chapter 3 provides unique historical 
features on regional-development paths in Vietnam, and analyzes historical 
background that affected the development in Vietnam’s provinces. Chapter 4 includes 
data descriptions and analysis. Chapter 5 develops the model and introduces the 
methodology. The empirical results will be discussed in chapter 6. Chapter 7 
summarizes the most important conclusions, and gives suggestions for further research 




Different regions in one country or different countries in the world follow a 
variety of growth patterns. Fundamental questions are why some are growing faster 
than others; what economic models can explain this variation? Since there is no single 
model of economic growth, there is no single theory for regional economic 
development. This chapter reviews neoclassical theories, new-growth theories, and the 
geographic economic-growth theories, and discusses how they relate to the research of 
regional growth in Vietnam. 
2.1. Neo-classical growth models  
2.1.1. The Solow-Swan growth model 
In a closed-economy Solow–Swan growth model (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956), 
economies differ in per capita income as a result of differences in the capital–labor 
(K/L) ratio. The Solow model allows for substitution between capital and labor. In the 
process, it assumes that there are diminishing returns to the use of these inputs. At any 
time, the economy has some amount of capital (K), labor (L), and knowledge or “the 
effect of labor” (A), and these are combined to produce output. Assume the aggregate 
production function takes the form of a Cobb–Douglas function:  
 1( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ,0 1Y t K t A t L tα α α−= < < , where t denotes time. 
.
( ) ( ) ( )K s t Y t K tδ= −  
where s is the savings rate and δ = 0.01 the depreciation rate.  
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This model is considered to be the basic reference point for almost all analyses of 
growth. For a given saving rate, a lower initial K/L is associated with faster 
proportionate increase in K/L on the path to equilibrium (Barro & Sala-I-Martin, 
1995).  
The Solow model implies that, regardless of their starting point, countries 
converge to their balanced growth paths—a situation where each variable in the 
growth model is growing at a constant rate. On the balanced growth path, the growth 
rate of output per worker is determined solely by the rate of technological progress. 
The model indicates that the accumulation of physical capital cannot account for either 
the vast growth over time in output per person or the vast geographic differences in 
output per person. The differences in real incomes are far too large to be accounted for 
by differences in capital inputs.  
There are different definitions of convergence. The first type is absolute 
convergence, which means every country will converge to a common Y/AL (output 
per unit of effective labor) and grow at rate g at the steady state (all countries have the 
same levels of income). This means that poorer countries will grow faster. The second 
type is conditional convergence, which means every country converges to its own 
steady state and grows at the rate g (all countries attain some steady state growth rate). 
They have different Y/AL. The further a country is from its steady state, the faster it 
grows. 
2.1.1.1. Baumol (1986) 
Several empirical studies have tested income convergence between countries. 
Baumol (1986) examines absolute convergence of per capita income from 1870 to 
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1979 among 16 industrialized countries for which Maddison (1982) provides data. 
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ln(Y/N) is log income per person, ε is an error term, and i indexes countries. If there is 
convergence, b (the slope coefficient for the explanatory variable ln(Y/N)) will be 
negative; countries with higher initial incomes have lower growth. A value for b of –1 
corresponds to perfect convergence: higher initial income on average lowers 
subsequent growth one for one, and thus output per person in 1979 is uncorrelated 
with its value in 1870. A value for b of 0, on the other hand, implies that growth is 
uncorrelated with initial income and thus there is no convergence. The results are: 
 
,1979 ,1870 ,1870
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(0.094) 
R2 = 0.87, s.e.e. = 0.15 
where the standard error of the regression coefficient is 0.094. The regression suggests 
almost perfect convergence among these countries: the national productivity levels 
tend to get closer, productivity growth rate and output per worker shows inverse 
relationship. The estimate of b is almost exactly equal to –1, and the two standard 
error confidence interval is (0.81, 1,18). The high correlation efficient (R2 = 0.87) 
indicates that the higher a country’s productivity level in 1870, the more slowly it 
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grows in the following century. In this sample, per capita income today is essentially 
unrelated to per capita income 100 years ago (Romer, 2005). 
2.1.1.2. DeLong (1988) 
DeLong (1988) criticizes Baumol’s (1986) that the sample suffers from 
selection bias, and the independent variable is unavoidably measured with error. 
Sample selection arises because Baumol’s regression uses an ex-post sample of 
countries that are now rich and have successfully developed. Those nations relatively 
rich in 1870 that have not converged are excluded in Maddison (1982)’s sixteen 
because of their resulting present relative poverty. Convergence is thus guaranteed in 
Baumol’s regression, which tells little about the strength of forces making for 
convergence among nations that in 1870 belonged to what Baumol calls the 
“convergence club.”  
DeLong argues that a fair test of convergence requires not an ex-post sample of 
countries that have converged but an ex-ante sample of countries that in 1870 looked 
likely to converge. He therefore considers the richest countries as of 1870; 
specifically, his sample consists of all countries at least as rich as the second poorest 
country in Baumol’s sample in 1870, Finland. This causes him to add seven countries 
to Baumol’s list (Argentina, Chile, East Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, 
and Spain) and drop one (Japan). The inclusion of the new countries weakens the case 
for convergence considerably. The regression of DeLong (1988) produces an estimate 
of b of –0.566, with a standard error of 0.144, and eliminates about half of the 
convergence that Baumol (1986) finds.  
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Moreover, according to DeLong (1988), least squares is not a satisfactory 
estimation technique because of errors in measuring 1870 incomes, creating bias 
toward finding convergence. Such errors include opposite errors in 1870-1979 growth 
and bias the regression slope toward -1. Such errors can produce the illusion of an 
inverse relationship between income in 1870 and growth since. 
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Here ln[(Y/N)i,1870]* is the true value of log income per capita in 1870 and 
ln[(Y/N)1870] is the measured value. ε and u are assumed to be uncorrelated with each 
other and with ln[(Y/N)i,1870]*. Unfortunately, it is not possible to estimate this model 
using only data on ln[(Y/N)1870] and ln[(Y/N)1870]*. The problem is that there are 
different hypotheses that make identical predictions about the data. For example, 
suppose that measured growth is negatively related to measured initial income, this is 
exactly what one would expect either if measurement error is unimportant and there is 
true convergence, or if measurement error is important and there is no true 
convergence. Technically, Romer (2005) thus states that the model is not identified. 
2.1.2. Infinite-Horizon, Overlapping-Generations, And Extended Solow Models 
2.1.2.1. The Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans Model, and the Diamond Model 
The Solow (1956) model treats other potential sources of differences in real 
incomes as either exogenous and, thus not explained by the model (in the case of 
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technological progress, for example), or absent altogether (in the case of positive 
externalities from capital, for example). Consequently to address the central question 
of growth theory (what constitutes worldwide growth and income differences across 
countries), we must move beyond the Solow model. 
Both the Ramsey (1928)–Cass (1965)–Koopmans (1965) model and the 
Diamond (1997) model resemble the Solow (1956) model. However, the dynamics of 
economic aggregates in their models are determined by decisions at the 
microeconomic level. Both models continue to take growth rates of labor and 
knowledge as given, but derive the evolution of the capital stock from the interaction 
of maximizing households and firms in competitive markets. The saving rate is no 
longer exogenous and constant. 
Ramsay (1928), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965) construct models where 
competitive firms rent capital and hire labor to produce and sell output, and a fixed 
number of infinitely lived households supply labor, hold capital, consume, and save. 
The model avoids all market imperfections and all issues raised by heterogeneous 
households and links among generations. Diamond (1965) developed the overlapping-
generations model and assumed that there is continual entry of new households into 
the economy. The model shows that it is possible for a decentralized economy to 
accumulate capital beyond the golden-rule level, and thus to produce an allocation that 
is Pareto-inefficient. 
According to Romer (2005), relaxing Solow’s model’s assumption of a 
constant saving rate has advantages. First and most important for studying growth, it 
demonstrates that the Solow model conclusions about the central questions of growth 
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theory do not hinge on its assumption of a fixed saving rate. Second, it allows 
researchers to consider welfare issues. A model that directly specifies relations among 
aggregate variables provides no way of judging whether some outcomes are better or 
worse than others. The infinite horizon and overlapping generations are built up from 
the behavior of individuals, and therefore can be used to discuss welfare issues. 
2.1.2.2. The Mankiw–Romer–Weil model 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) augment the standard Solow (1956) model 
with human capital accumulation and examine income convergence. They find support 
for the Solow model and evidence supporting conditional convergence if population 
growth, savings rates, and education are included in the estimation.  
Their model is as follows: 
1( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]Y t K t H t A t L tα β α β− −=  where H is the stock of human capital 
.
.
0.5 ( ) ( ) ( )
0.5 ( ) ( ) ( )
K s t Y t K t






The steady state income per capita is: 
( )ln ln (0) ln( ) ln( )
( ) 1 1





= + + − + +  − − 
 
where n is the average growth rate of working-age population (including those from 
15 to 64 years old), s is the average share of real investment in real GDP, and Y/L is 
the real GDP in 1985 divided by the working-age population in that year. 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) use annual data covering the years from 
1960 to 1985. The sample of countries studied includes 98 non-oil-producing, 75 
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intermediate, and 22 member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. Including human capital in their research lowers the estimated 
effects of saving and population growth to roughly the values predicted by the 
Augmented Solow model. The results provide coefficients on saving and population 
growth that have the predicted sign. Coefficients on ln(s) and ln(n + g + δ) are equal in 
magnitude and opposite in sign and insignificant in tests in any of the samples. 
Differences in saving and population growth account for a large fraction of the cross-
country variation in income per capita. However, the data strongly contradict the 
prediction that α = 1/3. The authors conclude that the convergence time is slower than 
in Solow model (35 years instead of 17 years). 
Islam (1995) uses a time panel-data approach to study growth convergence. 
The main usefulness of the panel approach is that it allows for the differences in 
aggregate-production function across economies. The time period is from 1960 to 
1985, and Islam takes every 5 years for each country in consideration (1960–1965, 
1966–1970, 1971–1975, 1976–1980, 1981–1985). His result is different from those 
obtained from single-country cross regressions like Mankiw et al. (1992) with a much 
higher conditional convergence rate, and lower α. 
2.2. New growth theory  
Neoclassical models show that capital’s earnings reflect its contribution to 
output if its share in total income is modest. Then capital accumulation cannot account 
for a large part of either long-run growth or cross-country income differences. The 
only determinant of income in the models other than capital is the “effectiveness of 
labor” (A), which represents knowledge or technology. Departing from the Solow 
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(1956) model treatment of technological progress as exogenous, the modern growth 
literature assumes endogenous technological progress. They consider human capital 
accumulation and research and development (R&D) activity as two important engines 
of economic growth.  
2.2.1. Research and development model 
The model involves labor (L), capital (K), technology (A), and output (Y), 
which are set in continuous time. There are two sectors, a goods-producing sector 
where output is produced and an R&D sector where additions to the stock of 
knowledge are made. The fraction aL of the labor force is used in the R&D sector and 
the fraction 1-aL in the goods-producing sector. Similarly, the fraction aK of the capital 
stock is used in R&D and the rest in goods production. Both aL and aK are exogenous 
and constant. Because the use of an idea or a piece of knowledge in one place does not 
prevent it from being used elsewhere, both sectors use the full stock of knowledge A. 
The quantity of output produced at time t is thus 
.
( ) ( ), 0L t nL t n= ≥  
The production of new ideas depends on the quantities of capital and labor engaged in 
research and on the level of technology; therefore the production function for 
knowledge can be written as 
[ ] [ ]
.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , 0, 0, 0K LA t B a K t a L t A t B
β γ θ β γ= > ≥ ≥  
where B is a shift parameter. The production function of knowledge is not assumed to 
have constant returns to scale to capital and labor. As for constant returns to scale, 
doubling the inputs doubles the amount that can be produced. But in the case of 
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knowledge production, exactly replicating what the existing inputs were doing would 
cause the same set of discoveries to be made twice, thereby leaving 
.
A  unchanged. 
That means it is possible to have diminishing returns in R&D. At the same time, 
interactions among researchers, fixed set up costs, and so on may be important enough 
in R&D that doubling capital and labor more than doubles output. Thus there is the 
possibility of increasing returns as well.  
As in the Solow model (1956), the saving rate is exogenous and constant, and 
depreciation is set to zero for simplicity. Thus, 
.
( ) ( )K t sY t=  
population is also considered as exogenous and nonnegative for simplicity. Thus, 
.
( ) ( ), 0L t nL t n= ≥  
Lucas (1988) shows how accumulation of skills may explain long-term 
economic growth. The important R&D-based growth-model studies include Romer 
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992), who point out 
the importance of knowledge or accumulation of ideas in the development of the 
economy. Their models provide examples that illustrate the private incentives for 
R&D and innovation.  
The consumer-surplus effect is that the individuals or firms licensing ideas 
from innovators obtain some surplus, since innovators cannot engage in perfect price 
discrimination. This creates a very positive externality from R&D. The business 
stealing effect is that the introduction of a superior technology typically makes 
existing technologies less attractive, and therefore harms the owners of those 
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technologies. This causes a negative externality. Thirdly, the R&D effect is that 
innovators are generally assumed not to control the use of their knowledge in the 
production of additional knowledge. Thus the development of new knowledge has 
positive externalities on others engaged in R&D.  
The net effect of these three externalities is ambiguous. It is possible to 
construct examples where the business-stealing externality outweighs both the 
consumer-surplus and R&D externalities. In this case, the incentives to capture the 
profits being earned by other innovators cause too many resources to be devoted to 
R&D. The result is that the economy’s equilibrium growth rate may be inefficiently 
high (Aghion & Howitt, 1992). It is generally believed, however, that the normal 
situation is for the overall externality from R&D to be positive. In the model 
developed by Romer (1990), the consumer-surplus and business-stealing effects just 
balance, so on net only the positive R&D effect remains. In this case, the equilibrium 
level of R&D is inefficiently low, and R&D subsidies can increase welfare. Their 
main conclusion is that endogenous technological progress is almost surely central to 
worldwide growth but probably has little to do with cross-country income differences. 
Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) observe that major 
innovations and advances in knowledge are often the result of the work of extremely 
talented individuals. They also observe that highly talented individuals typically have 
choices rather than just pursuing innovations and producing goods. These observations 
suggest that the economic incentives and social forces influencing the activities of 
highly talented individuals may be important to the accumulation of knowledge. 
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Baumol takes a historical view of the issue. He argues that, in various places 
and times, military conquest, political and religious leadership, tax collection, criminal 
activity, philosophical contemplation, financial dealings, and manipulation of the legal 
system have been attractive to the most talented people in the society. He also argues 
that these activities often have negligible (or even negative) social returns. These 
activities are often forms of rent-seeking—attempts to capture existing wealth rather 
than to create new wealth. Finally, he argues that there has been a strong link between 
how societies direct the energies of their most able members and whether the societies 
flourish over the long term (Romer, 2005). 
Murphy et al. (1991) provide a general discussion of the forces that influence 
talented individuals’ decision about whether to pursue activities that are socially 
productive. They emphasize three factors in particular. The first is the size of the 
relevant market: the larger the market from which a talented individual can reap 
returns, the greater are the incentives to enter a given activity. The second factor is the 
degree of diminishing returns. Activities whose scale is limited by the entrepreneur’s 
time (performing surgeries, for example) do not offer the same potential returns as 
activities whose returns are limited only by the scale of the market (creating 
inventions, for instance). Thus, for example, well-functioning capital markets that 
permit firms to expand rapidly tend to promote entrepreneurship over rent-seeking. 
The final factor is the ability to keep the returns from one’s activities. Thus, clear 
property rights tend to encourage entrepreneurship, whereas legally sanctioned rent-
seeking (through government or religion, for example) tends to encourage socially 
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unproductive activities. Therefore, the allocation of talents is important for growth 
(Romer, 2005). 
To understand further income differences among countries and to determine 
the extent they are due to differences in physical-capital accumulation, differences in 
human-capital accumulation, and other factors, Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1997) extended the Solow (1956) model by including human capital 
(H) in the model. The Cobb-Douglas production function makes the model tractable 
and leads easily to quantitative analysis: 
Y(t) = K(t)α[A(t) H(t)]1- α 
Y output, K capital, and A the effectiveness of labor are the same as in the Solow 
model. H is the total amount of productive services supplied by workers. It includes 
the contributions of both raw labor (skills that individuals are endowed with) and 
human capital (that is, acquired skills). 
The dynamics of K and A are the same as in the Solow model (1956). An 
exogenous fraction s of output is saved, and capital depreciates at an exogenous rate δ. 
Thus, 
.
( ) ( ) ( )K t sY t K tδ= −  
The effectiveness of labor grows at an exogenous rate g: 
.
( ) ( )A t gA t=  
The model assumes that each worker’s human capital depends on his or her years of 
education, denoted E. Thus, 
H(t) = L(t) G(E) 
 20
where L is the number of workers and G(.) is a function giving human capital per 
worker as a function of years of education per worker. The number of workers grows 
at an exogenous rate n: 
.
( ) ( )L t nL t=  
The more education a worker has, the more human capital they have. As 
individuals acquire human capital, their ability to acquire additional human capital 
may improve. Also, according to Romer (2005), the microeconomic evidence suggests 
that each additional year of education increases an individual’s predicted wage by 
approximately the same percentage. If wages reflect the labor services that individuals 
supply, this implies that G(.) is indeed increasing. Specifically, 
( ) , 0EG E eφ φ= >  
By dividing both sides of the output function by the number of workers, Li, Romer 
used the growth accounting across countries for his analysis to measure directly all 
ingredients of the equation other than Ai and then compute Ai as a residual. Thus, 
ln ln (1 ) ln (1 ) lni i i i
i i i
Y K H A
L L L
α α α= + − + −  
Subtracting αln(Yi/Li) from both sides of the above equation, then diving both sides by 
1-α, this yields 












This expresses output per worker in terms of physical-capital intensity (that is, the 
capital-output ratio, K/Y), labor services per worker (H/L) and a residual. It assigns 
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long-term effects of changes in labor services per worker and the residual entirely to 
those variables. 
Data on output and the number of workers are available from the Penn World 
Tables. Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) estimate 
physical-capital stock using data on investment, and reasonable assumptions about the 
initial stocks and depreciation. Data on income shares suggest that α, physical capital’s 
share in the production function, is around one-third for almost all countries. 
Hall and Jones (1999) estimate the stock of labor services by considering years 
of schooling. They assume that Hi takes the form eΦ(Ei)Li, where Ei is the average 
number of years of education of workers in country i and Φ(.) function: Φ(E) = ΦE. 
They argue that microeconomic evidence suggests that the percentage increase in 
earnings from an additional year of schoolings falls as the amount of schooling rises. 
On the basis of this evidence, they assume that Φ(E) is a piecewise linear function 
with a slope of 0.134 for E below 4 years, 0.101 for E between 4 and 8 years, and 
0.068 for E above 8 years. 
They estimate the contributions of physical-capital intensity, schooling, and 
the residual to output per worker in each country, and compare the five richest 
countries in their sample with the five poorest. The average output per worker in the 
rich group exceeds the average in the poor group by a surprising factor of 31.7. On a 
log scale, this is a difference of 3.5. The differences in the average [α/(1-α)]ln(K/Y) 
between the two groups is 0.6; in ln(H/L), 0.8; and in lnA, 2.1. They find that only a 
sixth of the gap between the richest and poorest countries is due to differences in 
physical-capital intensity, and less than a quarter is due to differences in schooling. 
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Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), using slightly different assumptions, reach 
similar conclusions. That means differences in physical capital and educational 
attainment explain only a small amount of the differences in output per worker. An 
additional finding from Hall and Jones’ (1999) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare’s 
(1997) decompositions is that the contributions of physical capital, schooling, and the 
residual are not independent. Hall and Jones (1999) find a substantial correlation 
across countries between their estimates of ln(Hi/Li) and lnAi(ρ= 0.52), and a modest 
one between their estimates of [α/(1-α)]ln(Ki/Yi) and lnAi(ρ= 0.52). They also find a 
substantial correlation between the two capital terms (ρ= 0.60). 
Hendricks (2002) criticized Hall and Jones’ (1999) paper in that their 
calculations did not take into account differences in human capital other than 
differences in years of education. Many sources of variation in human capital such as 
school quality, on-the-job training, informal human-capital acquisition, child-rearing, 
and even prenatal care diverge significantly across countries. A natural approach to 
comparing the overall human capital of workers in different countries is to compare 
the wages they earn in the same labor market. Since the United States has immigrants 
from many countries, this can be done by examining the wages of immigrants from 
different countries in the United States. Looking at immigrants’ wages provides 
important information about whether there are large differences in human-capital 
quality. This idea was implemented by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and by 
Hendricks (2002). These authors find that immigrants to the United States with a 
given amount of education typically earn less when they come from lower-income 
countries. This suggests that cross-country differences in human capital are larger than 
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suggested solely by differences in years of schooling, and that the role of a residual is 
therefore smaller.  
Secondly, instead of imposing the piecewise linear form assumed by Hall and 
Jones (1999), Hendricks estimates the returns to different amounts of education. His 
results suggest somewhat smaller differences in human capital across countries, and 
hence somewhat larger differences in a residual. Thirdly, Hendricks examines the 
possibility that low-skill and high-skill workers are complements in production. In this 
case, the typical worker in a low-income country (who has low skills) may have low 
wages in part not because output for a given set of inputs is low, but because he or she 
has few high-skill workers to work with. And indeed, the premium to having high 
skills is larger in poor countries. Hendricks finds that when he chooses an elasticity of 
substitution between low-skill and high-skill workers to fit the cross-country pattern of 
skill premia, he is able to explain a moderate additional part of cross-country income 
differences. The combined effects of these extensions to Hall and Jones’s (1999) 
simple approach are not large. Hendricks found an overall role for human-capital 
differences in income differences that is slightly smaller than what Hall and Jones 
estimated. 
2.2.2. Social infrastructure  
Hall and Jones (1999) also mentioned another hypothesis—that differences in 
cross-country income may be due to social infrastructure. By infrastructure, Hall and 
Jones mean institutions and policies that align private and social returns to activities, 
and provide incentives for individuals and firms in an economy. There are certainly 
many different aspects of social infrastructure. Romer (2005) divides them into three 
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groups. The first group consists of features of the government’s fiscal policies. For 
example, the tax treatment of investment and marginal tax rates on labor income 
directly affect relationships between private and social returns. Only slightly more 
subtly, high tax rates induce such forms of rent-seeking as devoting resources to tax 
evasion and working in the underground economy despite its relative inefficiency.  
The second group of institutions and policies that make up social infrastructure 
consists of factors that determine the environment in which private decisions are 
made. If crime is unchecked or there is a civil war or a foreign invasion, private 
rewards to investment and to activities that raise overall output are low. At a more 
mundane level, if contracts are not enforced or the court’s interpretation of them is 
unpredictable, long-term investment projects are less attractive. Similarly, 
competition, with its rewards for activities that increase overall output, is more likely 
when the government allows free trade and limits monopoly power. The final group of 
institutions and policies that constitute social infrastructure are ones that affect the 
extent of rent-seeking activities by the government itself.  
As Hall and Jones (1999) stress, although well-designed government policies 
can be an important source of beneficial social infrastructure, the government can be a 
major rent-seeker. Government expropriation, the solicitation of bribes, and the doling 
out of benefits in response to lobbying or to actions that benefit government officials 
can be important forms of rent-seeking. Because social infrastructure has many 
dimensions, poor social infrastructure takes many forms. Corrupt government 
officials, severe impediments to trade, poor contract enforcement, and government 
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interference in production are some examples they offer of bad “social infrastructures” 
that could lead to low levels of output growth.  
The most prominent studies about the relationship between social 
infrastructure and economic performance are by Sachs and Warner (1995), Knack and 
Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002, 
2004). These papers provide measures of social infrastructure and examine how these 
measures are related to the level of growth rate of average incomes. They all show 
much lower levels of social infrastructure in the tropics. A country’s poor 
infrastructure is almost surely not a consequence of its poverty. For example, social 
infrastructure in much of Europe a century ago was much more favorable than social 
infrastructure in most of Africa today. And it is hard to see how the poor social 
infrastructure could be a direct result of geography. Thus, there seems to be more to 
the tropics’ poverty than the disadvantages of geography.  
Hall and Jones in their (1999) paper argue the data suggest that social 
infrastructure has a quantitatively large and statistically significant relationship to 
output per worker, and that variations in social infrastructure account for a large part 
of cross-country income differences. Unfortunately, the problems created by 
measurement errors and especially potential correlation of social infrastructure with 
omitted variables are very difficult to address persuasively. As a result, Hall and 
Jones’ (1999) evidence is far from decisive. Moreover, the hypothesis that the tropics’ 
poverty is a direct consequence of geography might not take into consideration other 
variables in the development process. 
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Olson (1996) provides a different type of evidence from divided countries 
including China, Germany, and Korea. For most of the post-World War II period, both 
Germany and Korea were divided into two countries. Similarly, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan are separated from China. Many factors that might affect income, such as 
climate, natural resources, initial levels of physical and human capital, and cultural 
attitude toward work, thrift, and entrepreneurship, were similar in the different parts of 
these divided areas. Their social infrastructures, however, were very different: East 
Germany, North Korea, and China were communist while West Germany, South 
Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan had relatively free market economies.  
In effect, these cases provide natural experiments for determining the effects of 
social infrastructure. If economies were laboratories, economists could take relatively 
homogeneous countries and divide them in half; they could then randomly assign one 
type of social infrastructure to one half and another type to the other, and examine the 
halves’ subsequent economic performances. Unfortunately, economies are not 
laboratories. The cases of the divided regions are perfect for the comparison. These 
regions were fairly homogeneous initially, and the enormous differences in social 
infrastructure between the different parts were the result of minor details of 
geography. 
The results of these natural experiments clearly show that social infrastructure 
does matter. In every case, the market-oriented regimes were dramatically more 
successful economically than the communist ones. In 1990, when Germany was 
united, output per worker was about 2.5 times larger in the West than in the East. 
When China reacquired Hong Kong in 1997, output per worker was about 10 times 
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larger in Hong Kong than in the mainland. Similarly, output per worker is between 5 
and 10 times higher in Taiwan than in mainland China. There is no reliable data on 
output per worker in North Korea, but South Korea’s output per worker is only 
slightly lower than Taiwan’s, while all Olson’s (1996) evidence suggests that North 
Korea’s is much lower than China’s. Thus in the cases of these very large cross-
country income differences, differences in social infrastructure appear to have been 
crucial.  
While social infrastructure might have a large effect on income, there are 
potentially many other factors besides social infrastructure that contribute to the 
output gap and economic-growth differences. Social infrastructure is also the result of 
national public policies, administrative system, resource allocation, investment 
planning, savings ratio, among other causes. There is a two-way effect interaction 
between political mechanism and infrastructure development, infrastructure and 
economic growth. Therefore, it is necessary to move beyond infrastructure and look at 
deeper and wider causes to explain these differences. 
2.3. Geography and economic development 
Hall and Jones (1997) include one physical measure of infrastructure: the 
distance of the country from the equator. It turns out that the relationship is powerful 
and robust. Distance from the equator is the single strongest predictor of long-term 
economic success in their specification even when the other measures of infrastructure 
are included. Being located at the equator, as Zaire and Uganda are, associated with a 
reduction in output per worker by a factor of 4.5 relative to the Scandinavian 
countries.  
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Bloom and Sachs (1998) also find a striking fact about cross-country income 
differences: average incomes are much lower in countries closer to the equator. 
Average incomes in countries within 20 degrees of the equator are less than a sixth of 
those in countries at more than 40 degrees latitude. Productivity growth in the tropics 
lagged far behind productivity growth in the midlatitudes since the middle of the 
nineteenth century, and all evidence suggests that the temperate zones continue to be 
the dynamic center of innovation in the world economy. Well over 90% of global 
R&D expenditure and at least that percentage of patents worldwide originate in the 
northern midlatitude economies.  
Bloom and Sachs (1998) mention Africa’s extraordinarily disadvantageous 
geography as the root of poverty and slow economic growth. Comparing the world’s 
major regions, tropical regions in general lag far behind temperate regions in 
economic development. As a consequence of its climate, soils, topography, and 
disease ecology, Africa suffers from chronically low agricultural productivity 
(especially food production), high disease burdens, and very low levels of 
international trade, which is concentrated in a few primary commodities. Poor 
geographic and economic conditions closely related to demographic circumstances 
lead to slow economic performance. Africa has the highest youth-dependency ratios, 
as a result of the combination of world’s highest fertility rates and falling levels of 
infant and child mortality. Productive capacity per capita is low, as well as the rates of 
savings and investment.  
Bloom and Sachs’ (1998) paper stresses the need for intensified research on 
the complex issues at the intersection of ecology and human society. They give three 
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reasons for focusing on geography: (a) There is little to be gained from yet another 
recitation of the damage caused by statism, protectionism, and corruption to African 
economic performance; (b) Most economists neglect the role of the forces of nature in 
shaping economic performance and treat economies as blank slates onto which another 
region’s technologies and economic history may be grafted, whereas geography plays 
an extremely prominent role as a determinant of long-term performance; (c) Good 
policies must be tailored to geographic realities. 
This idea has also been advocated by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997), 
Diamond (1997), Sachs (2001), and others. Bloom and Sachs (1998), Sachs (2001), 
Easterly and Levine (2002) argue that tropical location leads to underdevelopment 
though mechanism such as (a) the fragility and low fertility of soils, (b) high 
prevalence of crop pests and parasites, (c) excessive plant respiration and lower rate of 
net photosynthesis, (d) high evaporation and unstable supply of water, (e) lack of dry 
season, (f) ecological conditions favoring infectious diseases for humans, (g) lack of 
coal deposits, and (h) high transport costs. 
Diamond (1997) supports the idea that weather and latitude conditions are 
important for development. For example, societies that live in the Fertile Crescent 
developed faster because of the weather condition, axis orientation, and endowment of 
wild animals and many animal candidates for domestication. Domestication of crops 
and animals allowed societies to increase food production, have stored food and 
therefore develop larger populations, enabling specialization (political elites, religious 
groups, and an army). He suggested that germs and crops directly affected the 
technological development of societies in the long run. By specializing, these societies 
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were able to develop more technologies, so they have the first-mover advantage over 
other less-developed societies. These peoples also developed some resistance to germs 
like smallpox and measles that they got from their farm animals, while other peoples 
lack farm animals and did not develop this resistance. Gun and germs have been used 
as weapons in order to conquer other less-developed societies. Geography does play a 
vital role. 
Other studies trace the effects of tropics, germs, and crops through institutions. 
Hall and Jones (1999) used institutional quality as one component of their “social 
infrastructure” (which explains productivity) with distance from the equator (along 
with European language) as instruments. They reason that Western Europeans have 
historically been associated with high-quality institutions, and Western Europeans 
settled in climates similar to Western Europe. Hall and Jones’ (1999) other component 
of social infrastructure reflects government policy—”openness” as measured by Sachs 
and Warner (1995), which also relates to Western European influence.  
According to Sachs and Warner (1995), an open economy is defined as one 
with none of the following five conditions: 
1. nontariff barriers covering on average more than 40% of imports 
2. average tariff rates of 40% or more  
3. a black-market exchange that is depreciated by 20% or more relative to the  
official exchange rate. 
4. A socialist economic system 
5. A state monopoly of major exports 
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They found a positive relationship between openness and growth. Very few 
developing countries have been continuously open after World War II. In 12 out of 15 
cases, average growth in the open period exceeds the growth in the closed period. 
They also find evidence that slow growth was not the cause for closing the economy. 
From 1970 to 1989, open economies outperformed closed economies in 
economic growth: in developing countries, open economies grew at 4.49% per year; 
closed economies at 0.69% per year. In developed countries, open economies grew at 
2.29%, closed at 0.74%. These results suggest that within the group of open 
economies, we tend to see convergence. Differences in income in the long run depend 
on policies regarding economic integration. Evidence shows that being open to 
international trade has been sufficient to achieve economic growth in excess of 2% for 
developing countries. Only four countries that grew had closed economies: Hungary, 
Tunisia, Botswana, and China. 
In another paper in 1997, Sachs and Warner offer some econometric evidence 
on the sources of slow growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. The evidence suggests that the 
continent’s slow growth can be explained in an international cross-country framework, 
without the need to invoke a special explanation unique to Sub-Saharan Africa. They 
find that poor economic policies have played an especially important role in the slow 
growth, most importantly Africa’s lack of openness to international markets. In 
addition, geographic factors such as lack of access to the sea and tropical climate have 
also contributed to Africa’s slow growth. 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) also consider 
institutional quality a fundamental determinant of economic development. However, 
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they argue that colonialism is the missing link. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) and 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) present evidence that there were large differences in 
colonization strategies. And these differences are almost surely an important source of 
differences in social infrastructure today. For example, the fact that countries like 
Canada, the United States, and New Zealand were settled by large number of 
Europeans who largely displaced the native population makes it unsurprising that 
those countries adopted European institutions. The exact channels through which 
colonization strategies affected institutional development are not clear however. For 
example, Acemoglu et al. (2001) stress the distinction between extractive states and 
settler colonies and the resulting effects on the strength of property rights. Engerman 
and Sokoloff (2002), in contrast, stress the impact of colonization strategies on 
political and economic inequality and the resulting effects on the development of 
democracy, public schooling, and other institutions. Another possibility is that there 
was greater penetration of European ideas, and hence European institutions, in regions 
more heavily settled by Europeans. 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) emphasize the disease environment. They note that 
Europeans adopted different types of colonization strategies. These different strategies 
of colonization affected institutional development, which is a main source of the 
income differences today. In tropical areas with extremely high mortality risks, 
particularly from malaria and yellow fever, European settlers established “extractive” 
institutions designed to exploit the areas’ population and resources with little 
settlement, and without supporting private property rights (e.g., Congo, Burundi, Ivory 
Coast, Ghana, Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru). On the other hand, in low-disease 
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environments including the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, they 
established “settler colonies” with institutions supporting private property and putting 
checks on the power of the State, similar to those in Europe. Therefore, they argue that 
geographic factors are central to the tropics’ poverty, not via their direct effect on 
output for given inputs and institutions, but through their past impact on institutional 
development. Acemoglu et al. (2001) use the empirical evidence from 64 countries’ 
settler mortality, protection versus expropriation and GDP data, to show that 
institutions have an impact on income. Based on their theory, they use settler mortality 
expected by the first European settlers in the colonies as an instrumental variable for 
the current institutions in these countries. Conditional on the variables they have 
controlled for, settler mortality more than 100 years ago should have no effect on 
output today, other than through its effect on institutions. Their results show that 
distance from the equator does not have an independent effect on economic 
performance. It is institutions that matter. 
However, their argument is not convincing because of the following reasons. 
First, there are two different waves of colonization: Mercantilist in the Americas and 
imperialist in Africa (Olson, 1996), thus all colonies should not be put together. 
Second, the data for Africa occurred before colonization, therefore this breaks the link 
between extractive institutions and high mortality rates. Also, settler mortality rates 
turn out to be a poor predictor of institutional quality. Disease factors were not only 
present but also brought to the native inhabitants by the colonizers. Thirdly, property-
rights institutions did not really exist when property-rights colonies were established, 
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and this breaks the link between the choice of property rights and extractive 
institutions.  
According to Acemoglu et al. (2002), setting up institutions that enforce 
property rights is costly. As a result, a transformation of extraction of property-rights 
institutions is expensive. The gain to the small group of ruling elites is large in an 
extractive-institution strategy. These gains depend on the size of the ruling elite: the 
smaller it is, the more incentives for an extractive institution. If agents make 
irreversible investments that are complementary, they will be willing to support the 
persistence of institutions—agents that spend in human capital and physical capital 
will spend on enforcing property rights. In other words, if agents make sunk-costs 
investments, they may be less willing to switch, causing the institutions to persist. 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) focus on the existence level of development in the 
colonized areas. Though Europeans introduced good policies in regions that were poor 
and introduced bad policies in regions that were rich, there is a great reversal in 
relative incomes today: those that were the most developed when being colonized are 
the least developed today. There is a negative association between economic 
prosperity in 1500 and today’s relative income. They argue that it was the introduction 
of extractive institutions in high urbanization places, contrasted with the introduction 
of “settler institutions” in low urbanization places that explains the reversal in 
incomes. In regions that were more densely populated and had more developed 
institutions, establishing extractive states was more attractive (because there was a 
larger population to exploit and an existing institutional structure that could be used in 
that effort), and establishing settler colonies was more difficult. The result, Acemoglu 
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et al. (2002) argue, was a “great reversal”: among the areas that were colonized, those 
that were the most developed on the eve of colonization are the least developed today. 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) emphasize the factor endowments and 
development paths among new-world economies. Factor endowments include soil, 
climate, and the size or density of the native population. Differences in native 
population, soil, and crops led to differences in inequality, and inequality affects 
institutions. Great equality or homogeneity led to more democratic institutions, to 
investing in public goods and infrastructure, and to institutions that offered broad 
access to economic opportunities. Institutions are not exogenous. 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) argue that another geographic characteristic 
had a large effect on colonization strategies: conduciveness to slavery. A majority of 
the people who came to the Americas between 1650 and 1800 came as slaves, and the 
extent of slavery varied greatly across different regions. They argue that geography 
was the key: although all the colonizing powers accepted slavery, slavery flourished 
mainly in areas suitable to crops that could be grown effectively on large plantations 
with heavy use of manual labor. These initial differences in colonization strategy, 
Engerman and Sokoloff argue, had long-lasting effects on the areas’ political and 
institutional development. 
The question of what these analyses imply about the sources of income 
differences among countries today is still a puzzle. The evidence about social 
infrastructure strongly suggests that the enormous income differences between tropical 
and temperate areas are not solely the result of direct effects of geography. One may 
argue that it is only through their impact on institutional development that the 
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geographic factors are affecting income today, and so the large income differences 
among regions subjected to different colonization strategies are strong evidence of the 
importance of institutions. Yellow fever, for example, has been largely eradicated 
throughout the world, and so cannot be a direct source of income differences today. 
The other view is that although the specific geographic characteristics that led to 
different colonization strategies are largely irrelevant to modern income differences, 
there are still geographic differences between temperate and tropical regions that 
directly affect income. In this view, the income differences between temperate and 
tropical regions are the result of both geography and institutions, and the differences 
cannot be used to clearly separate the effects of the two set of factors. These issues are 
active and hotly debated areas of research.  
The literature has considered a lot of factors contributing to economic growth: 
from capital–labor ratio, to population, saving rate, education, capital accumulation, 
R&D, allocation of talents, the size of market, and infrastructure to geographical 
location. However, each study focuses on only one or few of those factors, and not all 
of them at the same time. Researchers have not combined those effects into a 
comprehensive picture, and evaluated the size of influences of each factor in the 
scenario. 
Most of the empirical studies about growth examined the case of cross-country 
convergence, but little has been done with cross-sectional convergence in one country. 
In the case of Vietnam, it will be beneficial for policy-makers to see the effects of the 
difference factors in the growth equation, and whether there is a convergence in 




REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM 
Vietnam, as a developing country in transition from a centrally planned to a 
market economy, has recorded impressive socioeconomic growth achievements since 
the launching of the successful “doi moi” reform process at the sixth National Party 
Congress in 1986. Over this period, real GDP per capita has more than doubled, 
poverty has been substantially reduced from well over 70% in the mid-1980s to 18.1% 
in 2004 (GSO, 2005). Real GDP growth has averaged 7% per annum since 1986, 
agricultural production and farmer incomes have risen significantly, the country’s 
international trade has flourished in both quantity and diversity, and foreign 
investment has been substantial as a share of GDP.  
Vietnam has seen great progress in economic and social development, but still 
enormous disparities are emerging. Growth has also been associated with an increase 
in inequality, particularly a widening rural–urban income gap, as well as growing 
disparities from various forms of isolation, such as geographic, social, ethnic, and 
linguistic. In an interview by The Vietnam Economic Times on April 9, 2007, John 
Hendra, United Nations Resident Coordinator for Vietnam, also mentioned several 
dimensions of inequality including the geographical dimension, both in terms of 
differences in life chances of people between provinces or between districts, and 
between urban and rural areas.  
Three regions account for more than two-thirds of Vietnam’s poor: the 
Northern Uplands, the Mekong Delta, and the North Central Coast (United Nations 
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Development Programme [UNDP], 2007). Why is there such a big gap among 
provinces? This chapter will provide brief history information and the dueling 
hypotheses on the regional growth of Vietnam. 
3.1. Economic Development History 
The division of Vietnam into north and south was rooted in the civil war 
between the Nguyen and the Trinh princes from the 17th to the 19th centuries, and 
was aggravated further by the French colonial regime, which divided Vietnam into 
three parts that had different administrative systems. Moreover, the division of the 
country in 1954 into two parts, each following a different political and economic 
system, added to the disparities between north and south that persist more than 30 
years after the reunification of the country (Le, 2005).  
In 1858, the French began their conquest of Vietnam starting in the south. By 
1893 France occupied all of Vietnam, as well as Cambodia and Laos, which they 
consolidated into a single territory known as Indochina. The French presence did not 
spur economic development. Indochina was considered a source of raw materials for 
French factories and a captive market for French goods. Vietnam saw little of the 
output generated during French occupation from the 1850s and prior to the Vietnam 
War. Although replete with rubber, coffee, and sugar resources, these sectors were 
exclusively controlled by French traders, and vast land requisition, crushing taxation, 
and preference for imports over indigenous industries led to devastating exploitation 
and little organic growth.  
Japan occupied Vietnam during World War II, and there was a serious famine 
in 1945 that killed over 2 million people and devastated the economy. After Japan 
 39
stripped the French of all power in March 1945, Ho Chi Minh announced the 
independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 2, 1945. 
3.1.1. North-South Partition 
France’s post-World War II unwillingness to leave Vietnam led to failed talk 
and an 8-year guerrilla war between the communist-led Viet Minh on one side and the 
French and their anticommunist nationalist allies on the other. A Viet Minh victory at 
Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 forced the dispirited French to sign a cease-fire agreement 
in Geneva that split Vietnam into two parts along the 17th parallel: North Vietnam, a 
Communist state, and South Vietnam, a French-backed republic.  
3.1.2. North Vietnam (1954–1975)  
At the time of the 1954 partition, Vietnam was overwhelmingly a rural society; 
peasants accounted for nearly 90% of the total population. During the ensuing 20 
years of political separation, however, the North and the South developed into two 
very different societies. In the North, the communists had embarked on a “socialist 
transformation” program intended to revolutionize the socioeconomic structure in 
which workers and peasants emerged as the nominal new masters of a socialist and 
ultimately classless state. Propertied classes were eliminated, and by 1960 all but a 
small number of peasants, artisans, handicraft workers, industrialists, traders, and 
merchants had been forced to join cooperatives of various kinds.  
The socialist transformation of the private sector into cooperative and state-run 
operations did not result in the kind of economic improvement the government needed 
to win over the peasants and merchants. The regime managed to provide better 
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educational and health-care services than had existed in the pre1954 years, but poverty 
was still endemic. The party attributed the “numerous difficulties” it faced to “natural 
calamities, enemy actions, and the utterly poor and backward state of the economy,” 
but also acknowledged its own failings. These included cadre incompetence in 
ideological and organizational matters as well as in financial, technical, and 
managerial affairs (Federal Research Division, 1987). 
The communist-controlled Vietnamese government relied on central planning 
to mobilize human and material resources during the battle for national independence 
and reunification. However, the central planning system, modeled on those of the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries, created enormous obstacles to economic 
growth and severe economic adversities. Like their counterparts in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, the primary objective of the Vietnamese managers of state 
enterprises and agricultural cooperatives was to meet government-established 
production targets. They paid little or no attention to the quality of their goods or to 
the cost of production. State enterprises were vertically integrated, retained large 
surplus labor forces, and accumulated huge inventories in the face of chronic shortages 
of supplies. There was virtually no incentive to develop management skills in 
marketing, quality control, product development, and finance (Litvack & Rodinelli, 
1999). 
3.1.3. South Vietnam (1954–1975) 
The South had a more prosperous economy without the Stalinist economic 
structure that stifled the North (Watkins, 2007). South of the demarcation line after 
partition in 1954, the social system remained unchanged except that power reverted to 
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the Vietnamese elite. The South's urban–rural network of roles, heavily dependent on 
the peasant economy, remained intact despite the influx of nearly a million refugees 
from the North; and land reform, initiated unenthusiastically in 1956, had little 
socioeconomic impact in the face of obstructions by the landowning class. In contrast 
to the North, there was no doctrinaire, organized attempt to reorganize the society 
fundamentally or to implant new cultural values and social sanctions.  
As the war in the South intensified, social disruption in both urban and rural 
life was created by countless numbers of civilians being forced to abandon their 
ancestral lands and severing their network of family and communal ties to flee areas 
controlled by the Viet Cong or exposing themselves to government operations against 
the communists. Traditional social structures broke down, leaving the society listless 
and bereft of a cohesive force other than the common instinct for survival. 
3.1.4. Reunification 
In early 1975, North Vietnamese regular military forces began a major 
offensive in the south, inflicting great damage to the south's forces. The communists 
took Saigon on April 30, 1975, and announced their intention of reunifying the 
country. The war ended in Vietnam in 1975. Also ended was nearly a century of 
foreign colonization and economic oppression.  
The war-torn country faced a destroyed infrastructure and crippled economy, 
and joined the Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries that practiced centrally controlled 
economic policies. The government played the dominant role in national economic 
activities. The state controlled all land and natural resources and virtually all 
productive activities. It allocated equipment and raw materials for production and 
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organized agriculture under a collective system. It managed the distribution of 
agricultural products and consumer goods for personal consumption through a process 
of egalitarian rationing, making Vietnam for all practical purposes a grants economy. 
Central planning set production targets, ignoring requirements for profit-making and 
eliminating competition among state-owned enterprises. Prices were set by the state 
planning agency at subsidized levels much lower than those of the “free” and “black” 
market, thereby creating a two-tiered price system. Jobs were guaranteed for everyone 
willing to work, but severe restrictions were placed on size, number of employees, and 
capitalization of nonstate enterprises (Litvack & Rondinelli, 1999).  
Economic stagnation marked the period after reunification from 1975 to 1985. 
Industrial production grew at an average of 0.6% per year, with agricultural output 
gaining only 1.9% yearly from 1976 to 1980. At the same time, the population was 
growing by nearly 1 million per year, twice the rate of GDP (Murray, 1997). Vietnam 
had an agrarian economy of peasants, with nearly 80% of the population working in 
agriculture. Despite this, food production was insufficient to feed the population, 
requiring extensive imports which eventually led to consumption outpacing income, 
and debts that equaled the national income by the early 1980s. Inflation was out of 
control and excessive state spending approached 45% of GDP (Bui, 2000). Vietnam’s 
economy was diverging compared to the rest of the world and it ranked among the 
worst, sharing an unfortunate position with Sub-Saharan Africa as one of the places on 
earth in the 1980s where masses of people were at risk of starvation (Murray, 1997). 
The country suffered further setbacks until finally embracing market reform.  
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In the early 1980s, Vietnam began its transformation into a multisector, 
market-based economy. The economy rose with impressive growth resulting in 
sweeping social and economic changes. From 1989 to 1995, Vietnam enjoyed a rapid 
influx of foreign investment, with real GDP growth greater than 8% in 1992 and 9.5% 
in 1993, contributing to a reduction in the poverty rate and an improvement in living 
standards (Ashwill & Thai, 2005). By the onset of the Asian economic crisis in July 
1997, the rate of growth had already begun to decelerate. In 1999, Vietnam’s GDP 
was only 4.8%, contributing to a rise in unemployment and poverty. Since 2000, an 
economic recovery has been underway with growth rate of over 7% per year. Vietnam 
is now committed to economic integration through its participation in global and trade 
organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations, and the World Trade Organization. The government has 
made great strides in creating a more efficient and open business environment by 
improving its legal framework and deregulating access to the market. The Enterprise 
Law promulgated in 1999 laid the groundwork for a healthy business environment.  
3.2. Current Situation of Regional Development in Vietnam 
The shift away from a centrally planned economy to a more market-oriented 
economic model brought new vitality to the economy and improved the quality of life 
for many Vietnamese. However, the north–south divergence is the most critical of 
disparities and is reflected in every aspect of the Vietnamese economy. As of 1989, 
the population in the south had an annual per capita income estimated at dong (VND) 
683,000, which was twice the income of the population in the north, estimated at VND 
345,000 (Le, 2005). Even in the Hanoi–Hai Phong area, where the population had an 
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income equivalent to the national average (around VND 500,000 in 1989), it was 
nevertheless only 40% of the average per capita income of the population in the Ho 
Chi Minh City area. The north-central coast, traditionally the poorest area of the 
country, had the lowest income level, about half the national average, and only 17% 
that in the Ho Chi Minh City metropolitan area. In the Red River Delta agricultural 
area of the north, where population density is the highest, the per capita income was 
only 77.5% of the national average and only two-thirds of the average per capita 
income of the Mekong River delta population in the south.  
Notwithstanding 3 decades of heavy emphasis on industrial development in the 
north, even government statistics indicate that a larger share of total industrial output 
in 1989 came from the south. The south’s contribution totaled 53% of heavy industry 
and 65% of light industry compared with 47% of heavy industry and 44% of light 
industry from the north. Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) accounts for 41% of total light-
industry output in 1989. Even state enterprises were more efficient in the south, 
accounting for about 65% of the total financial contribution of all state enterprises to 
the government budget. 
In the south, output per worker averaged 3.6 times that of the north in heavy 
industry and 2.5 times that in light industry. Mining, food processing, tourism, and 
financial services also are concentrated in the south, further accentuating the economic 
disparities of the two regions.  
A recent study by the United Nations Development Programme in Vietnam in 
June 2004 looked into the difference in development between 7 northern provinces 
(Quang Ninh, Hai Duong, Hung Yen, Ha Tay, Bac Ninh, Bac Giang and Vinh Phuc) 
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and 4 southern provinces (Dong Nai, Binh Duong, Long An and Ba Ria) in Vietnam. 
The gap between them is marked (See Table 1; Nguyen et al., 2004). 
Table 1 
Northern Seven and Southern Four Provinces: Economic Comparisons 
 Northern 7 Southern 4 
Population (million) 10 5 
Exports per capita $50 $785 
Implemented FDI per capita $60 $570 
Enterprise Law Investment pc $84 $103 
New jobs per 1000 (2000–2002) 





Source: Nguyen, D. C., Tuan, P. A., Van, B., & Dapice, D. (2004). History or policy: Why don't 
northern provinces grow faster? New York: United Nations Development Program. 
The fast growth of southern provinces around Ho Chi Minh City is often 
explained by their superior location and/or their more recent experience with a free 
market system before Doi Moi (the economic-renovation process). However, another 
region of Vietnam has good infrastructure, is close to major ports and markets, and has 
access to well-trained workers: the northern provinces near Hanoi and Hai Phong. Yet 
their recent population growth is among the slowest in the country, while provinces 
near Ho Chi Minh City are among the fastest. Considering job growth from 2000 to 
2002 as a measure, the four southern provinces with only half of the northern 
provinces’ population created 209,000 jobs, nearly triple the northern group, which 
created only 70,000. Da Nang province alone created 30,000 jobs with only 7% of the 
northern provinces’ population. As to exports, the four southern provinces in 2003 
exported nearly $4 billion (excluding oil and gas), while the northern seven had under 
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$0.5 billion, including coal. The Mekong Delta, excluding Long An, exported $1.7 
billion. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) followed the pattern: from 2001 to 2003, the 
four southern provinces had $2.9 billion of implemented FDI while northern provinces 
had only $0.6 billion. Per capita Enterprise-Law investment from 2000 to 2003 was 
20% lower in the north. By these measures, the northern provinces are not doing as 
well as might be expected: it is not just that they lag the fast growing south, but in 
important respects, they lag other regions with fewer advantages of location, 
infrastructure, and access to skills and markets. 
3.2.1. Dueling Hypotheses 
One reason given for this striking underperformance of northern provinces is 
history. This northern area has a long experience with old-style central planning. It 
lacks relatively recent memory of a market economy and so had to learn to deal with 
foreign and even domestic private investors. There is open debate about whether 
southern provinces benefited from a southern legacy and affinity with a market 
mechanism. Because southern provinces were only under a centrally planned system 
for 11 years (between 1975 and 1986), many of the entrepreneurs under the old regime 
reemerged after the beginning of economic reforms. In this view, the lack of 
bureaucratic understanding, social structures, and habits of thought limit the upside 
growth in the north. There is no recent tradition of entrepreneurship in the north, but 
this does not explain why many from the region come down to the south to do 
business, or why there have been similar numbers of Enterprise-Law startups over 
1000 population in Bac Ninh and Dong Nai. 
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Nguyen et al. (2004) suggest looking at growth patterns and strategies in 
provincial differences. In practice, the ability to set up and successfully run a business 
can be likened to a race with many hurdles. There is hurdle for getting land, for access 
to capital, for permission and freedom from instructive inspections, for knowledge of 
markets, for technical know-how, and so on. Also, different provinces have unique 
elements that are impossible to replicate. The growth problem of Vietnam is the 





The main sources of data used in this research were from the GSO (1996–
2006), the Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative (VNCI, 2005), the World Bank (1996-
2006), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 1990, 2005, 2007). 
These are nationally and internationally recognized think-tanks, policy-making 
institutes, and nongovernmental organizations that have long been known for their 
high reputation for research and contribution to the economic-development process.  
4.1. Data sources and collection 
4.1.1. Vietnam Living Standard Surveys  
In the past 10 years, the GSO has carried out four national living-standard 
surveys in 1992–1993, 1997–1998, 2002 and 2004. Their main content reflects living 
standard of households and basic socioeconomic conditions in communes/wards that 
affect the living standard of people in the region. 
The first survey was implemented between October 1992 and October 1993. It 
included a household survey, a community survey, and a market-price survey. The 
household survey included household size and composition, health, anthropometric 
measures of nutrition, education, housing characteristics, migration, employment, 
nonfarm enterprises, agriculture, other income, expenditures, food consumption, 
ownership of consumer durables, and savings and credit. The household questionnaire 
was approximately 110 pages long and included about 1,000 questions. The sample 
was selected in three stages using data from the 1989 population census. First, 120 
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villages and 30 urban precincts were selected at random, with probabilities 
proportional to the population. Then two rural hamlets or urban blocks were selected 
in each selected village/precinct. Finally, 16 households were selected in each selected 
hamlet/block, making a total sample of 4,800 households. The sample was designed to 
be representative at the level of the seven geographic regions of Vietnam.  
The second Vietnam Living Standards Survey was conducted from December 
1997 to December 1998. Like the 1992–1993 Vietnam Living Standards Survey, the 
survey included a household survey, a community survey, and a market-price survey, 
though a survey of health centers was added. The household questionnaire covered the 
same topics as the 1993 survey, with only slight changes in the questions and format. 
The household sample included most of the households from the 1993 survey, as well 
as additional households to provide better coverage of urban areas and the Central 
Highlands. The sample contained 6,000 households and was representative for each of 
ten strata, the rural areas of the seven geographic regions and three urban strata (Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City, other cities, and towns).  
The Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey was carried out in 2002 and 
2004 (see Appendix E). The survey has two versions: a small questionnaire (36 pages) 
administered to about 60,000 households and a larger questionnaire (43 pages) 
administered to a smaller sample of about 15,000 in 2002. The larger questionnaire 
had an expenditure module, allowing calculation of more reliable expenditure-based 
estimates of living standards. The household questionnaire in the Vietnam Household 
Living Standards Survey 2002 is simplified as compared with previous ones, but still 
compatible with previous surveys. The survey in 2004 was simplified even further 
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than the 2002 version, with a sample size of 45,000 households, of which 9,000 
included all topics (core and rotated modules including topics on agriculture and 
household business), and 36,000 did not include the expenditure topic (income 
sample/households). 
Information from these surveys provides data on income classified by region 
that was used for this research, measuring regional economic growth. The household 
questionnaires concentrated on income and expenditure of households to assess living 
standards on national, regional, and provincial levels. The survey scope was 
households and communes/wards which were selected in 61 provinces and cities.  
4.1.2. Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index 
Under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-
funded VNCI Project, the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) on the business 
environment was collected. It served the purpose of this research on regional growth 
of Vietnam well: an effort to explain why some parts of the country perform better 
than others in terms of private sector dynamism and growth. 
In 2002, The Asia Foundation and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry undertook an initial research effort in 14 provinces to study the interplay of 
economic and governance factors in generating provincial growth. This became the 
foundation for a broader study of regional differences undertaken by the VNCI (2006) 
to identify the most critical economic-governance determinants of growth in Vietnam. 
The PCI assesses and ranks provinces by their regulatory environments for private 
sector development, controlling for differences in initial endowments. In 2005 the PCI 
covered 42 provinces, accounting in total for 90% of the national GDP. Using survey 
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data from businesses that describe their perceptions of the local business environment, 
as well as credible and comparable data from official and other sources regarding local 
conditions, the PCI rates provinces on a 100-point scale. The overall index is 
comprised of nine subindices that explain much of the variation in performance across 
provinces in Vietnam. 
In 2006, the PCI was constructed with two new subindices: Labor Training—
assessing efforts to help overcome skills shortages at the provincial level, and Legal 
Institutions—measuring the degree of confidence that businesses have in provincial 
legal institutions. A larger data set in 2006 allows for the inclusion of all 64 provinces. 
The PCI subindices will be used to evaluate governance factors in a regional-growth 
equation. 
4.1.3. Vietnam Development Reports 
Every year, the World Bank (1996-2006), UNDP (1990, 2005, 2007), and 
other nongovernmental organizations sponsor annual reports and in-depth analysis 
about Vietnam, including those on economic, social, and environmental development. 
The data from these reports and from researchers, professors currently working on 
Vietnam development issues, are also used as sources of reference in this dissertation.  
4.2. Data Coverage 
The data in this research consists of observations on 42 provinces in Vietnam 
from 1998 to 2003. This time period was chosen because it was 12 years after the “doi 
moi” policy, when economic reform started having effects on the economy and overall 
economic performance of each province. The data continue until 2003, because after 
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that many provinces in the data set were split into two parts or rebordered under 
Government Decree Number 310/TCTK-PPCD in effect beginning July 1, 2004.1 The 
number of observations is 42 provinces instead of all 61 provinces because of the 
availability of data. These 42 provinces encompass 90% of national GDP. 
The provincial GDP (dependent variable) data are collected from the GSO 
(2005). Indices on entry costs, access to land, transparency and access to information, 
time costs of regulatory compliance, informal charges, implementation and 
consistency of policies, state-sector bias, proactivity of provincial leadership, private-
sector development policies, level of development (human capital), quality of 
infrastructure/urbanization, proximity to the market, population, FDI, and initial GDP 
are used as explanatory variables to analyze the current situation of provincial 
development in Vietnam. A detailed explanation of each potential determinant of 
growth is discussed in chapter 6. 
                                                 




METHODOLOGY AND DEVELOPING THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
Economic growth models reach different conclusions depending on model 
specifications. In many cross-country and cross-sector growth studies, when there are 
several possible explanatory variables, the results vary depending on the particular set 
of variables used. Therefore, attempts have been made to examine the “robustness” of 
coefficient estimates, to find the best model specification, or ways of combining 
alternative model specifications. 
Many candidate regressions have equal theoretical status, but the estimated 
coefficients on the variables of interest in these regressions may depend importantly 
on the conditioning set of information. Levine and Renelt (1992) examine whether 
conclusions from existing studies are robust or fragile to small changes in the 
conditioning-information set. They use a variant of Edward E. Leamer’s (1983) 
extreme bound analysis (EBA) to test the robustness of coefficient estimates to 
alterations in the conditioning set of information. A large number of variables in a 
broad collection of growth studies are considered in the context of statistical 
significance and theoretically predicted sign when the conditioning set of variables in 
the regression changes. They find that almost all the identified relationships are very 
sensitive to small alterations in the conditioning set of variables, and many publicized 
coefficients change sign with small changes in the conditioning set of variables.  
So what is the EBA method? According to Leamer (1983), in Bayesian terms, 
the “extreme bounds” are applicable when the prior distribution for a subset of 
coefficients is located at the origin but is otherwise unspecified, and the prior 
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distribution for the other coefficients is “diffuse.” He performed a sensitivity analysis 
to determine if features of the posterior depend importantly on the way this partially 
defined prior distribution is fully specified. EBA uses equations of the form 
i m zY I M Z uβ β β= + + +  
where Y is either per capita GDP growth or the share of investment in GDP, I is a set 
of variables always included in the regression, M is the variable of interest, and Z is a 
subset of variables chosen from a pool of variables identified by past studies as 
potentially important explanatory variables of growth. The analysis involves varying 
the subset of Z-variables included in the regression to find the widest range of 
coefficient estimates on the variable of interest, M, that standard hypothesis tests do 
not reject.  
Levine and Renelt (1992) first chose a variable that had been the focus of past 
empirical studies, M, and ran a “base” regression that included only the I-variables and 
the variable of interest. Then they computed the regression results for all possible 
linear combinations up to three Z-variables and identified the highest and lowest 
values for the coefficient on the variable of interest, βm, that cannot be rejected at the 
0.05 significance level. Thus, the extreme bound is defined by the group of Z-
variables that produces a maximum value of βm plus two standard deviations. The 
degree of confidence that one can have in the partial correlation between Y and M 
variables can be inferred from the extreme bounds on the coefficient βm. If βm remains 
significant and of the same sign at the extreme bounds, then one can maintain a fair 
amount of confidence in that partial correlation. In such a case, the result is referred to 
as “robust.” If the coefficient does not remain significant or if the coefficient changes 
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sign, then one might feel less confident in the relationship between the M and Y 
variables, because alterations in the conditioning-information set change the statistical 
inferences that one draws regarding the M–Y relationship. In this case, the result is 
referred to as “fragile.” 
Growth economists are interested in the “true model” that includes significant 
variables to determine what elements are really correlated with growth. The theoretical 
model and the procedure for determining robust variables will be presented in this 
chapter. 
5.1. Theoretical model of economic growth: 
Assume that provincial growth (Yt) is determined by the following generalized 
Cobb-Douglas production function, 
(1) ( )t t t t t t t t tY A K L Q AQ K L
α β β α β= =  
where Qt is the efficiency of Labor and At is a time-varying, scaling variable that 
includes factor-neutral technology shocks. 
Dividing both sides by population Nt gives 
(2) ( 1)t t tt t t
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This can be expressed in log form as 
(3) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ( 1) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )t t t t t ty k l N A Qα β α β β= + + + − + +  
where , ,t t tt t t
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Differentiating equation (3) with respect to time yields 
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(4) 
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It follows that 
(5) 1 0 1 0ln( ) ln( ) ( 1)[ln( ) ln( )] ty y N N Cα β− ≅ + − − + , where 
[ ] [ ]1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0[ln( ) ln( )] [ln( ) ln( )] ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )tC k k l l A A Q Qα β β= − + − + − + −  
This theoretical structure specifically identifies population as an important 
determinant of economic growth. However, the last term, Ct, is sufficiently general 
that any number of variables could be argued for inclusion. 
5.2. A procedure for determining robust variables 
5.2.1. The Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) and the corrected version of Akaike 
Information Criterion (AICc)  
The first step consists of identifying the best specification. There are a number 
of powerful modern tools to assist with model selection. Two model-selection criteria 
were used for this purpose: the (SIC); and the corrected version of the AIC (AICc). 
The SIC and AICc respectively represent the two main, competing schools of thought 
regarding how to conceptualize the task of selecting the best model.  
The first key property to consider when evaluating model selection is called 
“consistency.” A model selection criterion is consistent if (a) when the true model is 
among the models considered, the probability of selecting the true model approaches 1 
as the sample size gets large, or (b) when the true model is not among those 
considered, so that it is impossible to select the true model, the probability of selecting 
 57
the best approximation to the true model approaches 1 as the sample size gets large. 
The SIC is by far the most commonly used of the several model-selection criteria that 
possess this property.  
On the other hand, in case either the true model or the best approximation to 
the true model is not in the set of candidate models considered, there is a different 
optimality property, called “asymptotic efficiency.” An asymptotically efficient 
model-selection criterion selects the model closest to the true model with probability 
convergence to 1 as the sample size becomes infinitely large. AIC, though 
inconsistent, is asymptotically efficient, whereas SIC is not.  
Because of different properties of SIC and AIC, Diebold (2001) suggested 
reporting and examining both SIC and AIC in practice. Most often, researchers select 
the same model. When they do not, he recommends using the more parsimonious 
model selected by SIC, other things being equal. This accords with what he calls 
“keep it sophisticatedly simple.” Other things being equal, simple models are preferred 
to complex ones. 
However, AIC suffers from overfitting in finite samples, incorporating too 
many variables in its best models. When the sample size gets large, AIC selects 
models that are too large (overparameterized). As a result, a number of finite sample 
corrections have been developed for the AIC. Of these, the most preferred is a version 
known as the corrected version of the Akaike Information Criterion, the AICc. The 
correction is of particular use when the sample size is small, or when the number of 
fitted parameters is a moderate to large fraction of the sample size. AICc is 
asymptotically efficient if the true model is infinitely dimensional. Furthermore, when 
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the true model is of finite dimension, AICc is found to provide better model order 
choices than any other asymptotically efficient method (Hurvich & Tsai, 1989). 
Monte Carlo studies of finite sample performance have demonstrated that both 
the SIC and AICc perform well relative to alternative procedures (McQuarrie & Tsai, 
1998). While there are a number of equivalent formulations, this research uses the 
following formulae: 
(6) .ln .ln( )SSESIC T k T
n
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where T is the number of observations, k is the number of coefficients in the model, 
including the intercept, and SSE is the sum of squared residuals from the estimated 
model. Note that SSE and k are the only parameters that vary across models, since 
sample size and the dependent variables do not change. The SIC and AICc make 
different tradeoffs between these parameters. Generally, the SIC penalizes additional 
explanatory variables more severely than the AICc, producing best models with fewer 
variables. 
Once the portfolios of models with best SIC and AICc are selected, the 
procedure continues with the second step using Extreme Bounds Analysis and 
Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to find the robust variables in the growth model. 
5.2.2. Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) and Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) 
EBA, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, is designed to study the 
sensitivity of coefficient estimates across different regression specifications. The 
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lower extreme bound is defined to be the lowest value of the coefficient estimate βm 
minus two standard deviations, and the upper extreme bound is defined to be the 
largest value of βm plus two standard deviations. The extreme bound test for variable 
M says that if the lower extreme bound for M is negative, and the upper extreme 
bound is positive, then variable M is not robust. That means if one finds a single 
regression for which the sign of the coefficient βm changes or becomes insignificant, 
then the variable is not robust.  
Levine and Renelt (1992) employed a version of this test to cross-country data 
and found that very few (or no) variables were robust. One possible reason is that very 
few variables can be identified to be correlated systematically with growth. Another 
explanation is that the test is too strong for any variable to pass it: if the distribution of 
the estimator of βm has some positive and negative support, then one is bound to find 
one regression for which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions 
are run. 
EBA weighs all model specifications equally, so a divergent coefficient 
estimate from a poorly specified equation can be sufficient to disqualify a variable as 
robust. Also, some of these specifications will have low R2 specifications and can lead 
to wide bounds. To solve this problem, Granger and Uhlig (1990) propose “reasonable 
extreme bounds analysis,” where bounds are derived for all specifications with R2 
values a given percentage of the maximum R2 value. The range of coefficient values is 
restricted to the set of specifications that produce R2 values within a given δ-value of 
the maximum achieved R2 across all specifications. However, they do not provide 
guidance of the choice of δ and acknowledge that the use of R2 has problems.  
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BMA directly addresses the “all specifications weighted equally” criticism by 
developing a system for weighting model specifications. BMA starts by positing a 
prior distribution for the population value for some parameter of the model 
specification (usually a regression coefficient). This prior distribution is updated with 
the results from regression estimates across (theoretically) all possible model 
specifications to form a posterior distribution of parametric values. The updating 
procedure weights the corresponding specifications by model probabilities that can be 
thought of as the conditional probability that a given specification is the “true model.”  
While the BMA approach is useful to weight specifications for forecasting 
purposes, it is problematic when used to weight coefficient estimates. Suppose the true 
model to study the relationship between dependent variable y and explanatory variable 
X1 is given by 0 ,
1
K
t k k t t
k
y Xβ β ε
=
= + +∑ , t = 1,…,T, where some βk may equal zero (but 
not β1); and Cov(Xj, Xk) = 0 for all j ≠ k. There are 2k possible linear combinations of 
these variables, and suppose the researcher considers each combination a potentially 
true model. Define P(Mj) as the prior probability that model j is the true model and let 
P(Mj) > 0 for all j.  
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where kj and SSEj are the number of included regressors and the sum of squared 
















is the estimate of β1 in model j. Any variable excluded from a particular 
model has a slope coefficient with a degenerate posterior distribution at zero (Sala-i-
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In each specification in which X1 appears, the preceding assumptions ensure 
that the least squares estimate is unbiased, so that E( 1, jβ
∧
)=β1. However, X1 appears in 
only half of all possible specifications. In the other 2K-1 models, X1 is excluded, and 
the BMA approach sets 1, jβ
∧
= 0. It follows that E(β1|y)< even if 1, jβ
∧
 = β1 in every 
specification in which it appears. In other words, the BMA-based expectation is biased 
toward zero. This follows directly from the fact that BMA “estimates” the value of β1 
to be zero in all specifications in which X1 is not included. 
Using the Bayesian arguments, a procedure developed by Poskitt and 
Tremayne (1987) can be used to estimate a set of specifications and reports the 
corresponding ranges of coefficient estimates and t-ratio for those specifications 
including the respective variables. Without giving all specifications equal weight, they 
identify two categories of models: (a) “reasonable” models, and (b) others. Only 
“reasonable” models are considered for extreme-bound analysis. 
Poskitt and Tremayne (1987) take as their point of departure that informational 
criteria such as the SIC and the AICc are themselves sample statistics, so that the 
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model with the lowest SIC or AICc value may not be the best model. They argue that 
all “close competitors” be included in a “portfolio” of “reasonable” models. 
Let I* be the value of the information criterion for the best model, and let IA be 
the corresponding value for an alternative model. The posterior odds ratio is defined as  
(11) ( )*exp .
2
AT I I ℜ = − −  
 
Poskitt and Tremayne (1987) characterize any model with 10ℜ < as a “close 
competitor” to the best model. They argue that it may be advantageous to extend the 
usual model-building process, suggesting not only that the model minimizing the 
criterion should be selected, but also that any additional specifications closely 
competing should not be discarded, thereby advancing the general notion of a portfolio 
of models. They present Monte Carlo evidence that model portfolios constructed in 
this manner behave well in finite samples. 
To summarize, the procedure of determining robust variables first constructs 
separate model portfolios using SIC and AICc selection methods. Then for each 
portfolio, EBA (Leamer, 1983) and BMA (Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery, & Volinsky, 
1999) methods are used. In this respect, the procedure is similar to Granger and 
Uhlig’s (1990) “reasonable extreme bound analysis,” except that the set of evaluated 
models is determined by Poskitt and Tremayne’s (1987) 10ℜ <  standard, rather 
than an arbitrary δ value. This procedure was also used by Reed (2006) in his model of 




This chapter provides empirical results from the economic growth model 
constructed in chapter 5. There are many different factors, ranging from population, to 
labor force, infrastructure, investment, geographic location, and provincial leadership 
that can affect regional economic development. The question is which of these factors 
should be included in the model, therefore affecting the provincial growth disparities 
in Vietnam, and how influential are those robust determinants of growth. 
6.1. Potential determinants of regional economic growth in Vietnam 
Considering the number of observations of 42 provinces, in order to avoid the 
problem of multicollinearity, and based on the availability of statistical data on 
Vietnam, this research takes into account the effects of the following variables as 
potential determinants of regional growth:  
1. Entry Costs measure the time it takes firms to register, acquire land, and 
receive all the necessary licenses to start a business. 
The entry-costs index was designed to assess the differences in entry costs for new 
firms across provinces. According to the Enterprise Law in 2000 and its subsequent 
implementing documents, these procedures should have become uniform across all 
provinces, but researchers on the Task Force to Implement Enterprise Law argue that 
they have not (VNCI, 2005). The index is built on a 10-point scale combining soft 
data (perceptions indicators from mail-out surveys to firms) and hard data (registration 
records from the Ministry of Planning and Investment). Perception indicators include 
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the percentage of firms waiting over a month to complete all steps necessary to start 
their business, percentage of firms waiting over 3 months to complete all steps 
necessary to start their business, effective waiting time for land to begin business 
activities. Hard indicators including firms per 1,000 citizens registered at the 
Provincial Department of Planning and Investment after the Enterprise Law, and 
registered capital between 2000 and 2003 as a percentage of provincial GDP in 2003. 
Among 42 provinces, Ninh Thuan has the lowest entry costs of 3.64 over a 10-point 
scale, while Da Nang has the highest entry costs of 8.77. 
2. Access to Land measure whether firms possess their official Land Use 
Rights Certificate, whether they have enough land for their business expansion 
requirements and the effective price of land in the province, taking into consideration 
demand and supply in the provinces, and the quality of industrial zone (IZ) policies. 
This is also a very practical issue, since limited access to useful land not only 
reduces opportunities for new business development, but also discourages investors 
from expanding businesses or using land-use rights as collateral for bank loans. On 
average, Southern provinces seem to outperform their Northern peers in access to land 
according to VNCI (2005) studies. Six indicators comprise the land policy index, 
including the percentage of firms with Land Use Rights Certificates or are in the 
process of receiving them; the percentage of firms without those certificates that rent 
land from family, friends, state-owned enterprises, or local agencies; the percentage of 
firms that feel land availability constrains their business expansion; provincial land 
conversion policies (from agricultural to manufacturing usage); effective land prices 
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(to avoid overland pricing)2, and quality IZ policy 3. HCMC has the best IZ score at 
2.83, followed by Binh Duong at 1.76, and Binh Dinh, Ninh Binh, Tay Ninh and Tien 
Giang all had scores of less than 0.10. 
3. Transparency and Access to Information measure whether firms have access 
to the proper planning and legal documents necessary to run their business, whether 
those documents are equitably available, whether new policies and laws are 
communicated to firms and predictably implemented, and the business use of the 
provincial web page. 
How to construct transparency and access to the information index is always of 
interest to economists. VNCI (2005) used Vishwanath and Kaufman of World Bank’s 
definition of transparency as “the increased flow of timely and reliable economic, 
social, and political information about government service provision, monetary and 
fiscal policy.” Their transparency index therefore encompasses five attributes: access 
(timely dissemination of information on provincial planning, laws, and regulations), 
equity (equitable access to information), consistency (fair implementation of 
provincial laws and regulations), predictability (knowledge of the direction of long-
term strategies to make informed business decisios), and openness (availability of 
business information on the provincial web-page). Among these attributes, openness is 
weighted to be 40% of the final index. Da Nang received the highest openness score, 
and ranks second after Quang Ninh on overall transparency and access to information 
index. 
                                                 
2 Effective Price = (Land Prices/Enterprises per 1,000)*(Percentage of Business Land/100) 
3 Quality of IZ policy = (IZs+Planned IZs)*(Occupancy Rate/100)*(Firm IZ Evaluation/100) 
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4. Time Costs of Regulatory Compliance measure how much time firms waste 
on bureaucratic compliance as well as how often and for how long firms must shut 
down their operations for inspections by local regulatory agencies. 
Many firms are interrupted from their business operations to deal with 
bureaucratic problems. This index evaluates the percentage of management’s time 
spent dealing with bureaucratic procedures and paperwork, and the improvement on 
reducing time taxes since the Enterprise Law, the frequency and length of tax 
inspection every year, and firms’ attitude toward inspection policy. Tax inspections 
were shortest in Tra Vinh, where it also has the lowest time costs of regulatory 
compliance. 
5. Informal Charges measure how much firms pay in informal charges and 
how much of an obstacle those extra fees pose for their business operations. 
This characterizes the amount that firms pay in informal fees, fines, and other 
extraordinary payments as they attempt to engage in the normal course of business. 
This group includes five indicators measuring the extent of the problem by gauging 
the frequency, type, and amount of extra payment: the percentage of firms that believe 
that extra payments are an obstacle; the percentage of firms that felt that enterprises in 
their line of business were subject to bribes from provincial authorities; the percentage 
of firms paying over 10% of their revenue in extra payment; macrocorruption (are 
commissions paid to provincial officials as a normal activity in bidding for 
government contracts); and extra fees to tax inspectors as a percentage of annual 
revenue. Binh Duong has the highest score on informal charges of 8.85, and HCMC 
has the lowest overall score of 3.38. 
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6. Implementation and Consistency of Policies measure the coordination 
between central and provincial governments, as well as the consistent application of 
central policies across provincial subagencies. 
In the wake of the Enterprise Law, a great deal of thought has gone into 
assessing whether provinces are adequately implementing economic reforms devised 
at the central level in Hanoi. Many provinces have been chastised by the Enterprise-
Law Implementation Committee for either ignoring central regulations, or actively 
thwarting central laws with subtle barriers or contradictory provincial regulations. The 
Implementation index measures the coordination between central and provincial 
governments, as well as the consistent application of central policies across provincial 
subagencies, with three measures: the percentage of firms that agreed that 
coordination between provincial and central government was good; implementation of 
provincial initiatives; and implementation of good plans (for social welfare, 
infrastructure, and private-sector planning). For the first indicator of coordination, An 
Giang, Bac Ninh, and Phu Yen all scored above 90%, while in Ha Tay, Binh Thuan, 
and Nam Dinh, only about half of the firms evaluated coordination highly. An Giang 
is also one of the most united provinces, with only 39% of firms believing that 
departments impeded provincial projects. Eight provinces, predominantly in the Red 
River Delta, had perfect scores of 100% on implementation of good plans. 
7. The State-Sector Bias measures the bias of the provincial government 
toward the state sector in terms of incentives, policy, and access to capital.  
In essence, do private firms feel that they face a fair and balanced environment or 
must they overcome a subtle bias toward the state in the form of special advantages or 
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soft budget constraints? Just as for the Entry-Costs Index, State-Sector Bias indicators 
are divided into a firms’ perceptions dimension that include five indicators and a 
dimension that include three hard indicators. The firms’ perceptions indicators include 
the percentage of firms that agree there is a bias in the decision-making on the part of 
provincial officials; a positive attitude toward the private sector, an improved attitude 
since the Enterprise Law;  an attitude affected by the firms’ revenue or employment 
contribution; equitization policy; and bias toward equitized firms. Hard indicators are 
composed of the average proportion of bank loans to the State-Sector Bias; the change 
in the number of local state-owned enterprises; and State-Sector Bias industrial output 
as a percentage of total provincial industrial output in 2003.  
8. Proactivity of Provincial Leadership measures the creativity and cleverness 
of provinces in implementing central policies and designing their own initiatives for 
private-sector development. 
Provincial officers may cost businesses considerable time and money, or they 
can save a lot of time and effort for firms with a proactive attitude. Four indicators 
determined the extent of provincial dynamism, and these are measured by the 
percentage of firms that agree or strongly agree with the following statements: (a) 
provincial officials are knowledgeable enough about present national law to find 
opportunities within existing law to solve firm problems; (b) provincial officials are 
creative and clever about working within the national law to solve the problems of 
private sector firms; (c) all good initiatives come from the provincial government, but 
the central government frustrates them; and (d) there are no good initiatives at the 
provincial level—all important policy comes from the central government. Binh 
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Duong scored the highest, and the first highest score Proactivity-Index provinces are 
all from the south. The lowest proactivity index score province is Ha Tay from the 
North. 
9. Private Sector Development Policies measure provincial policies for the 
private-sector trade promotion provision of regulatory information to firms, business 
partners’ matchmaking and capacity training to improve the quality of labor in the 
province. 
The Proactivity index is comprised of four questions that attempt to measure 
how well provincial officials are performing in resolving problems on behalf of firms. 
Firms were asked to rank their provinces on a 5-point scale to gauge how effective 
they thought their province’s policies were in the following four areas: provision of 
market information; matchmaking for business partners; business consulting; and 
labor training. The highest scoring provinces were the Southern provinces of Can Tho, 
Vinh Long and Tay Ninh. The six lowest scoring provinces were all in the Red River 
Delta area in the North. 
10. The Level of Development (Human Capital) index is composed primarily 
of labor quality and primary-achievement test scores, but also includes measures of 
road quality and the percentage of paved roads in rural areas. Red River Delta 
provinces have a slight advantage over the South in human scores. Mekong Delta 
River scores especially low on human capital and quality of infrastructure. 
11. Quality of Infrastructure/Urbanization index is associated with the 
percentage of the population living in urban areas; the number of telephones per 
capita; the quality of transport measured by the millions of tons shipped per kilometer; 
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the percentage of the economy devoted to agriculture; and whether a province is or 
shares a border with one of the five national-level cities (Hanoi, HCMC, Hai Phong, 
Da Nang, and Can Tho). This final measurement picks up not only urbanization but 
also the benefits of the special infrastructure allotments that go along with the 
national-level city designation. 
12. Proximity to the Market captures the distance that must be traversed for a 
private firm to sell its product. Average retail sales as a measure of GDP grant a view 
of the size of the intraprovincial market.4 Distance from Ha Noi to HCMC is a simple 
measure of how long it would take for a firm to tap into the lucrative markets in the 
two metropolises. Finally, the cost of shipping a 40-cubic foot container from Tokyo 
captures the cost of access to export markets. Ha Noi and HCMC top the list followed 
by a number of Red River and Northern Southeast provinces that benefit from their 
close proximity to those two cities.  
13. Population, average of population over the years of research interest, is a 
determinant of growth, and closely relates to labor force and economic development. 
The question of whether population growth has a positive or negative influence on 
development depends on different countries’ situations. For many Eastern European 
countries, governments worry about population reduction that might affect the 
country’s long-term growth. Population increase is desirable in these countries 
because it is considered favorable for short-term and long-term development. In 
Vietnam, more than half of the population was born after the end of the war in 1975. 
                                                 
4 This measure was created by taking the best estimates of Viet Port and Evergreen shipping companies, 
firms that engage in this activity regularly. Mountainous regions and the Mekong River Delta were 
particularly expensive because containers needed to be unpacked and then restuffed. 
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The baby-boom placed more pressures on the devastated economy after the war. Too 
high a population-growth rate means slower economic development. The government 
decided to impose a two-child-policy per family, encouraging young couples to have a 
maximum of two children. In recent years, the population growth rate has been 
reduced and become more stable, but how much effect does it have on regional 
growth? 
14. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) impacts Vietnam economic growth in 
general national economy and in provinces in particular. Stocks of FDI flow into some 
provinces with better initial conditions such as infrastructure or close proximity to 
major markets, changing the pace of local economic growth.  
15. Initial GDP measures the provincial GDP level in the year 1998. Some 
provinces have lower starting points, some have higher starting points. The coefficient 
estimate of the Initial GDP variable can provide some insight into growth convergence 
of provinces in Vietnam. 
These preceding variables attempt to capture the economic influences 
represented by 
[ ] [ ]1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0[ln( ) ln( )] [ln( ) ln( )] ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )tC k k l l A A Q Qα β β= − + − + − + −  in 
equation (5) of chapter 5. There are approximately 32,767 ways of combining 15 
variables. Each of these permutations, appending a core set of “free” variables, can be 
thought of as a single model. Thus, the empirical problem consists of choosing the 
best model or set of models from these 32,767 possibilities. The data consists of 42 
observations from 1998–2003. The general specification for the empirical model 
equation (5) is 
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DLNY = β0+ β1DNNN+ β2y0+ β3FDI+ β4pop+ β5human+ β6infra+ β7proxi+ β8entry+ 
β9access+ β10trans+ β11time+ β12charge+ β13imple+ β14soebias+ β15proact+ β16private+εt 
where Y is the change in Provincial GDP from 1998 to 2003 and the rest are potential 
determinants of growth discussed earlier. DNNN is the change in population from 
1998–2003. 
Table 2 
List of Variables and Explanation  
Variable Name Explanation 
y0 Initial GDP: provincial GDP level in the year 1998 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
Pop Average population from 1998 to 2003 
Human 
The Level of Development (Human Capital): a measure of  labor quality and 
primary-achievement test scores, and road quality and the percentage of paved 
roads in rural areas 
Infra Quality of Infrastructure/Urbanization:  a measure of infrastructure and transportation quality 
Proxi Proximity to the Market: a measure of the travel distance for a private firm to sell its product 
Entry Entry Cost: a measure of the firm’s time to register, acquire land, and receive all the necessary licenses to start business. 
Access Access to land: A measure of firms access to land use rights certificate, business expansion, and the quality of industrial zone policies. 
Trans Transparency and Access to information:  a measure of firms’ access to planning and legal documents. 
Time Time Costs and Regulatory Compliance:  A measure of firms’ wasting time on bureaucratic compliance and inspections by local regulatory agencies. 
Charge Informal Charges:  A measure of firms’ payment in informal charges extra fees pose in their business operations. 
Imple 
Implementation of Policies and Consistent Application across Provincial Sub-
Agencies:  a measure of the coordination between central and provincial 
governments, and the consistent application of central policies across provincial 
sub-agencies. 
Soebias State Sector Bias: a measure of the bias of provincial governments toward state owned enterprises (SOES) in terms of incentives, policy, and access to capital. 
Proact 
Proactivity of Provincial Leadership:  a measure of the creativity and cleverness 
of provinces in both implementing central policy and designing their own 
initiatives for private sector development. 
Private 
Private Sector Development Policies:  a measure of provincial policies for private 
sector trade promotion, provision of regulatory information to firms, business 
partner matchmaking, and capacity training to improve the quality of labor in the 
province. 
6.2. Empirical Analysis and Results 
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. In the first step, a regression 
that uses the full set of regressors is estimated. In the second step, model-selection 
 73
criteria to identify the best SIC and best AICc specifications were used among the 
32,767 total possible models. These best models were then compared to the model 
with all variables. Finally, EBA was used in separate SIC and AICc portfolios of 
“reasonable” models to identify which determinants of regional development growth 
are robust. 
6.2.1. Specification With All Variables  
Table 3 reports the results of estimating Equation (5) using the full set of 
explanatory variables. In this table, DLNN coefficient on the change in provincial 
population, is positive in sign but not highly significant (p-value > 0.0001), while the 
coefficient on average national population growth over these years has a negative sign 
showing an inverse relationship between population boom and economic growth, but 
is not highly significant. Variables such as entry cost, access to land, time costs of 
regulatory compliance, and state-owned-enterprise bias bear negative signs, among 
which access to land and state-owned-enterprise bias have t-statistics greater than 2. 
The last variable of the growth equation, private-sector development policies is 
negative in sign with t-statistic less than 2. Other variables including human capital, 
infrastructure, proximity to market, transparency and access to information, informal 
charges, implementation and consistency of policies, and proactivity of provincial 
leadership all bear a positive sign and are healthy factors in the growth process. 
Among them, only the proactivity variable has a t-statistic greater than 2. Next, the 
SIC and AICc selection criteria were used to select the best models.  
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Table 3 
Regression Results Using All Variables 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
dlnn 0.09281 0.16 
Initial GDP 0.40505 3.10 
FDI 0.06138 0.67 
Population –0.00006417 –2.58 
Human Capital 0.01536 1.69 
Infrastructure/Urbanization  0.02234 1.02 
Proximity to the Market 0.00433 0.43 
Entry Costs –0.02320 –1.14 
Access to Land -0.06659 –2.19 
Transparency and Access to Information 0.02350 1.08 
Time Costs of Regulatory Compliance –0.00582 –0.32 
Informal Charges 0.03073 1.83 
Implementation and Consistency of Policies 0.01693 0.77 
State Sector Bias –0.09974 –3.14 
Proactivity of Provincial Leadership 0.04024 2.02 
Private Sector Development Policies –0.01005 –0.68 
Observations: 42, R2 = 0.7826, SIC = 213.6780, AICc = 245.7441 
6.2.2. Best SIC and AICc Specifications 
Table 4 reports results from the best specifications chosen by the SIC and 
AICc model-selection criteria. The best specification means the lowest SIC and AICc 
values out of 32,767 possible specifications. The best SIC model includes Initial GDP, 
Population, Human Index, Informal Charges, State-Sector Bias, and Proactivity with t-
statistics greater than 2.0. The best AICc model includes Initial GDP, Population, 
Human Index, State-Sector Bias and Proactivity with t-statistics greater than 2.0. In 
both best SIC and AICc models, the regression specifications produce similar 
variables, except for the Access to Land variable that appears only in the best AICc 
model. These suggest the role of State-Sector Bias and Proactivity of Provincial 
Leadership factors of regional growth differences in addition to Initial GDP, 
Population, and Human Capital. 
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Table 4 






dlnn 0.46996 1.11 0.50164 1.22 
Initial GDP 0.45173 5.94 0.50051 6.33 
Population –0.00005158 –2.54 –0.00005376 –2.72 
Human Capital  0.02550 3.79 0.01974 2.69 
Infrastructure/Urbanization --- --- --- --- 
Proximity to the Market --- --- --- --- 
Entry Costs --- --- --- --- 
Access to Land --- --- –0.04118 –1.73 
Transparency and Access to Information --- --- --- --- 
Time Costs of Regulatory Compliance --- --- --- --- 
Informal Charges 0.03200 2.11 0.02940 1.99 
Implementation and Consistency of Policies --- --- --- --- 
State Sector Bias –0.11491 –4.28 –0.10918 –4.15 
Proactivity of Provincial Leadership 0.03082 2.65 0.04014 3.21 
Private Sector Development Policies --- --- --- --- 
Number of observations    42  42  
R2 0.7213  0.7446  
SIC 213.6780  213.7581  
AICc 246.1403  245.7441  
 
6.2.3. Extreme Bound Analysis 
Following the EBA convention, robust variables are those whose coefficient 
estimates are all same-signed and lie more than two standard deviations away from 
zero. Two portfolios of models (one for SIC, one for AICc) were analyzed; not every 
variable appears in every specification within a given portfolio. According to current, 
robust variables are required to appear in at least 50% of the specifications in either 
portfolio. 
The SIC portfolio consists of 10 different models as defined by the 10ℜ <  
criterion. The results from analyzing this portfolio of models are reported in Table 4A. 
Robust variables (identified with an “R”) are Initial GDP, Population, Human Capital, 
State-Sector Bias, and Provincial Proactivity. The AICc portfolio consists of 10 
different models, and the same variables including Initial GDP, Population, Human 
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Index, State-Sector Bias, and Proactivity of Provincial Leadership are robust variables 
reported in Table 5B.  
Table 5A 
Extreme Bounds Analysis for Portfolio of Top SIC Models 
Range of coefficient estimates  Range of t-ratios Number 
(percent) Robust Variable Low Mean High  Low Mean High 
5 (100%) R y0 0.3608 0.45624 0.511  3.22 5.49 6.33 
2 (25%) -- FDI 0.08756 0.08756 0.08756  1.1 1.1 1.1 
5 (100%) R Pop –0.0000683 –0.0000593 –0.0000516  –3.57 –2.984 –2.54 
5 (100%) R Human 0.0185 0.02204 0.0255  2.42 3.058 3.79 
0 (0%) -- Infra --- --- ---  --- --- --- 
0 (0%) -- Proxi --- --- ---  --- --- --- 
0 (0%) -- Entry --- --- ---  --- --- --- 
3 (60%) -- Access –0.046 –0.04358 –0.041  –1.86 –1.795 –1.73 
0 (0%) -- Trans --- --- ---  --- --- --- 
0 (0%) -- Time --- --- ---  --- --- --- 
4 (80%) -- Charge 0.02903 0.03014 0.032  1.89 1.9967 2.11 
0 (0%) -- Imple --- --- ---  --- --- --- 
5 (100%) R Soebias –0.11799 –0.10321 –0.08496  –4.38 –3.972 –3.5 
5 (100%) R Proact 0.02556 0.03239 0.04014  2.15 2.662 3.21 
0 (0%) -- Private  --- --- ---  --- --- --- 
 
Table 6 collects the robust variables from these EBAs and reports them, along 
with a mean estimated effect calculated as the simple average of the respective mean 
in Tables 5A and 5B. Table 6 identifies five variables as robust determinants of 
regional economic growth: Initial GDP level, Population, Human Capital, State-Sector 
Bias, and Provincial Proactivity. All have the expected signs. The small value for the 
mean estimated effect of Population level signifies a very small effect of initial GDP 
on regional growth. A 1% increase in initial GDP gives an estimate of 4.5% increase 
in regional growth rate. The estimated effect of Human Capital and Provincial 
Proactivity are also relatively small. The estimated effect of State-Sector Bias 
indicates that a 1% increase in State-Sector Bias lowers the growth rate by 0.105%, 
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and a 1% increase in Proactivity of Provincial Leadership increases the overall growth 
rate by 0.03%. 
Table 5B 
Extreme Bounds Analysis for Portfolio of Top AIC Models 
Range of coefficient estimates  Range of t-ratios Number 
(percent) Robust Variable Low Mean High  Low Mean High 
5 (100%) R y0 0.3608 0.44804 0.511 3.22 5.07 6.33 
2 (40%) -- FDI 0.08359 0.08359 0.08359 1.02 1.06 1.1 
5 (100%) R Pop –0.00006832 –0.00005722 –0.00005158 –3.57 –2.874 –2.54 
5 (100%) R Human 0.0165 0.02037 0.0255 2.06 2.766 3.79 
0 (0%) -- Infra — — — — — — 
0 (0%) -- Proxi — — — — — — 
0 (0%) -- Entry — — — — — — 
3 (60%) -- Access –0.046 –0.04228 –0.04 –1.86 –1.75333 –1.67 
0 (0%) -- Trans — — — — — — 
0 (0%) -- Time — — — — — — 
4 (80%) -- Charge 0.02679 0.02931 0.032 1.79 1.945 2.11 
0 (0%) -- Imple — — — — — — 
5 (100%) R Soebias –0.11799 –0.107846 –0.08496 –4.38 –4.11 –3.5 
5 (100%) R Proact 0.02898 0.03491 0.04014 2.48 2.834 3.21 
0 (0%) -- Private  — — — — — — 
 
Table 6 
Robust Variables and Mean Estimated Effects 
Variable Name Estimated Effect
Initial GDP level 0.45214 
Population -0.000058241 
Human Capital 0.021205 
State Sector Bias (AIC model) -0.105528 
Proactivity (SIC model) 0.03365 
“Mean” estimated effects: simple average of the “mean” coefficient estimates in Table 5A and 5B  
6.3. Remarks from empirical analysis 
Among the robust determinants from the regression results, besides population, 
initial GDP and human capital that commonly have their weights in every growth 
equation, the determinants of State-Sector Bias and Proactivity of Provincial 
Leadership raised concern about provincial governance in the development process. 
The development picture of Vietnam becomes more interesting because under one 
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government, one legal system, one economic policy, the provincial leadership does 
play a vital role in promoting their provincial economic performance.  
State-Sector Bias here does not necessarily include competition in the same 
product or service. It may also include competition for skilled labor, land, or credit. 
Some provinces have stated explicitly that their primary goal is to promote large state-
owned champions as the primary engine of growth, allowing the private sector to 
serve only as a supplier of intermediate goods and services to the state sector 
(Malesky, 2004). Others may not have such explicit bias, but instead have an 
institutional incentive to promote State-Sector Bias, because of the high employment 
and revenue they generate for the province. In other cases, it is the rents they can 
generate and the resources they control that incentivize local officials to maintain 
state-control of State-Sector Bias. In any case, promoting State-Sector Bias is not a 
long-term strategy for provincial economic success because these privileged 
companies will need to eventually compete in the international market or in an 
expanded Vietnamese market. Without the special privileges to which State-Sector 
Bias have grown accustomed, they will find it very difficult to succeed against more 
efficient privately owned domestic and international firms.  
Proactivity of Provincial Leadership toward the private sector therefore plays a 
vital role in development. As indicated by the VNCI (2005) project, ambiguity is a 
standard part of doing business in Vietnam. This is often the result of unclear wording 
in legal documents, long delays in implementing documents being promulgated for 
central laws or decrees, contradictions between implementing documents (circulars, 
directives, official letters, and People’s Committee’s decisions), and even central laws 
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themselves. For many industry segments new to Vietnam, there is a lack of any clear 
legal regime. A few provinces even use these uncertainties as barriers to firms that 
might offer competition to their local champions. In these cases, provinces which are 
creatively clever about working within the confines of central law can be of major 





This dissertation analyzes factors associated with regional growth disparities in 
Vietnam. The striking difference among regions in Vietnam is a pressing issue faced 
by the country with a high growth rate only second to China in today’s Asia. After 
reviewing the history as well as current situation of regional growth in Vietnam, the 
research examines the determinants of regional economic growth of 42 provinces in 
Vietnam from 1998 to 2003.  
Using a generalized Cobb-Doublas production-function framework, this 
research considers a number of potential explanatory variables yielding 32,767 
possible linear combinations of variables, each representing a potentially true model. 
The EBA method is used to sort out these different model specifications to identify 
robust determinants of regional economic growth. It analyzes the current situation by 
using data from 42 provinces from 1998 to 2001. EBA was used to find the robust 
variables. The SAS program sorted out 32,767 possible linear combinations of the 15 
variables. After purging out the effects of nonrobust variables, the results confirm the 
effects of Initial GDP levels, Population, Human Capital, State-Sector Bias, and 
Proactivity of Provincial Leadership as important determinants of growth.  
This highlights the role of provincial management in creating a favorable 
business environment, especially for the private sector. It also raises an interesting 
issue in Vietnam - even under the same national law, the interpretation and 
implementation of law can vary among different provinces. Also, providing incentives 
 81
for the private sector, lowering trade barriers, inducing technology exchange, and 
enhancing education are all important factors contributing to the equation of growth. 
The empirical results identify five robust determinants of Vietnam regional 
economic growth over the years from 1998 to 2003. Among these are Initial GDP 
levels, Population, Human Capital, State-Sector Bias, and Proactivity of Provincial 
Leadership. This finding highlights the importance of public policy as a determinant 
of economic growth. A saying in Vietnam is, “The King's Laws Bow Before Village 
Regulations” (Phep vua thua le lang): provincial authorities should take this into 
account in creating a more favorable environment to promote their local development. 
The approach is related to the “reasonable extreme bound analysis” of Granger 
and Uhlig (1990). However, the SIC and the AICc are first used to choose “portfolios 
of reasonable models,” as suggested by Poskitt and Tremayne (1987), before 
conventional EBA within these portfolios are tested. An advantage of this approach is 
that it uses standard SAS procedures and can be easily implemented by other 
researchers. 
The analytical framework presented here can be applied to other economic 
growth models at both the micro and macro levels. The model can also be used to 
analyze economic-growth differences among regions in developing as well as 
developed countries, especially in the case of newly emerging economies like China, 
Korea, and Russia. 
In Vietnam, using the same approach and methodology, with availability of 
data and systematic collection and analysis, this research can be extended to 64 
provinces in Vietnam over a longer period of time. But reformed macroeconomic 
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policies are needed to correct short-term imbalances now, together with guidelines for 
provincial authorities to realize and create a favorable supportive local economic 
environment. If Vietnam is to fulfill its potential for providing a healthy and 
prosperous life for its people, these reforms must be drastic and part of a consistent 
long-term strategy aimed at rapid, sustainable, balanced regional economic growth and 
equality for its people. With so much of its history dominated by conflict, Vietnam is 
vulnerable to social and regional disparities that can lead to widespread violence—
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APPENDIX A 
ADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF VIETNAM 
  
Source: University of Texas Libraries (2001).
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APPENDIX B 
REGIONAL MAP OF VIETNAM 
 
Source: Wikipedia. (2007). Retrieved from, http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam. 
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APPENDIX C 
GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS OF VIETNAM 
REGION I: Red River Delta includes the following provinces: Ha Noi, Hai Phong, 
Ha Tay, Hai Duong, Hung Yen, Ha Nam, Nam Dinh, Thai Binh, and Ninh Binh. 
REGION II: North East includes the following provinces: Ha Giang, Cao Bang, Lao 
Cai, Bac Kan, Lang Son, Tuyen Quang, Yen Bai, Thai Nguyen, Phu Tho, Vinh Phuc, 
Bac Giang, Bac Ninh, and Quang Ninh. 
REGION III: North West includes the following provinces: Lai Chau, Son La, and 
Hoa Binh. 
REGION IV: North Central Coast includes the following provinces: Thanh Hoa, 
Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien Hue. 
REGION V: South Central Coast includes the following provinces: Da Nang, Quang 
Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa. 
REGION VI: Central Highlands includes the following provinces: Kon Tum, Gia 
Lai, and Dac Lac. 
REGION VII: North East South includes the following provinces: Ho Chi Minh, 
Lam Dong, Ninh Thuan, Binh Phuoc, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Dong Nai, Binh Thuan, 
Ba Ria – Vung Tau. 
REGION VIII: Mekong River Delta includes the following provinces: Long An, 
Dong Thap, An Giang, Tien Giang, Vinh Long, Ben Tre, Kien Giang, Can Tho, Tra 
Vinh, Soc Trang, Bac Lieu, and Ca Mau. 





STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF DATA 
Table B1 
Statistical Summary of Data 
Variable Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Initial GDP 0.3086200 0.2428385 0.1590508 1.5354938
FDI 0.2458038 0.4212480 0.0012963 1.6374732
Population      1467.1300      886.43168      523.38000      5278.0700
Human Capital 6.0640476 2.3998964 1.0000000 10.0000000
Infrastructure/Urbanization 3.9161905 1.6760493 0.9900000 10.0000000
Proximity to Market 6.3404762 2.3019366 1.0100000 10.0000000
Entry Costs 6.1071429 1.1107332 3.6400000 8.7700000
Access to Land 6.1559524 0.9829995 3.6700000 8.3200000
Transparency and Access to Information 4.6459524 1.0612971 2.7800000 7.1200000
Time Costs of Regulatory Compliance 6.3359524 1.0801311 4.0100000 8.3500000
Informal Charges 6.2528571 1.2606411 3.3800000 8.8500000
Implementation and Consistency of Policies 6.2235714 1.1629689 2.7700000 8.2700000
State Sector Bias 5.8721429 0.8024005 4.1700000 8.5300000
Proactivity of Provincial Leadership 5.6309524 1.7515370 1.2000000 9.3000000
Private Sector Development Policies 5.1873810 1.5870437 1.0500000 8.1400000
DLNY 3.0816567 0.1709354 2.8124502 3.8309811











Household head (capitalized)……………………….    Household number ………….. 
Ethnic group ………………………………………………………………………........ 
Address............................................................................................................................. 




Date      Date 
Team head     interviewer 
(sign & name)     (sign & name) 
 
 
Section 1: List of household members 
 
1. Please you tell the full name of each person, who has been having meals, sleep, 
and sharing income and expenditure in your household, start with household 
head. 
2. Sex: male…1, female….2 
3. Relationship to head of household: head…1, wife/husband….2, child…3, child 
in law…4, parents….5, sister/brother…6, grandfather/grandmother…7, 
grandchild…8, other relationship…9 
4. What month and year (Solar calendar) was [NAME] born? 
5. How old is [NAME]? 
6. What is the current marital status of [NAME]? : never married…1, 
married…2, widowed…3, divorced…4, separated…5 
 
Section 2: Education 
 
1. Which grade has [NAME] finished?  
2. Can [NAME] read and write?: Yes…1, No….2 
3. What was the highest degree [NAME] obtained?: No degree…0, Primary…1, 
Lower Secondary School…2, Upper Secondary School…3, Technical 
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worker…4, Professional secondary school…5, Junior college diploma…6, 
Bachelor’s…7, Master’s …8, Candidate/Doctor…9 
4. In the past 12 months, has [NAME] attended school? : Yes….1, No…..2 
5. In the past 12 months, what is the expenses for [NAME] to go to school? 
A. Tuition and registration fees to study outside of school district 
B. Contribution to school, class (building, parents’ association,…) 
C. Uniforms and other clothing required by the school 
D. Textbook, reference book 
E. Other school tools (paper, pens, bag, pencil…) 
F. Extra classes (include language, computer) 
G. Other expenditures (transportation, lodging) 
H. Total (A+B+….+G) 
6. Is [NAME] exempted from tuition and other contributions? 
7. What is the reason for [NAME]’s school fee exemption?: Poor…1, Ethnic 
Minority…2, Martyr…3, Disabled, sick veteran policy households….4, remote 
area…5, have difficult situation…6, primary pupils…7, other (specify…..)….8 
8. Exemption percentage 
9. Over the last 12 months, has [NAME] received scholarship or subsidy thanks 
to educational records?: No….1, Yes…2 
10. What is the value of the scholarship or subsidy received during the past 12 
months? 
11. Expenses for other courses (housework, tutorial, typewriting, foreign language, 
computer skills)? 
 
Section 3: Employment 
 
1. In the last 12 months: 
a) have you worked for pay for a unit or someone who is not a member of your 
household? Yes….1, No…2 
b) have you worked in a field, garden or forest pilot belonging to your household, 
or have you raised livestock or aquatic products? Yes…1, No…2 
c) have you worked in a business enterprise or profession organized and managed 
by your household? Yes…1, No…2 
2. Have work? Yes…1, No…2 
3. How many hours did you work in the past 7 days?  
4. Have you looked for or wanted to work during the past 7 days? 
5. What is the reason for you not having looked for a work or wanted to work in 
the last 7 days? Be studying…1, do housework…2, Not be able to work…3, 
have a job…4, can’t find a job/don’t know where to find a job…5, other 
(specify…)…6 
6. What is the most time consuming work among the ones you were doing in the 
last 12 months? 
7. Organization, function/product of this work? 
8. For whom did you work? Self-employed…0, work for other households…1, 
government agencies, police, military/communist party, social 
organization…3, state-owned enterprises…4, other state economic sector…5, 
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collective economic sector…6, private capitalist economic sector…7, state 
capitalist economic sector…8, foreign shared enterprises…9 
9. For how many months in the past 12 months did you do this work? 
10. During these months, how many days did you usually work per week? 
11. During these days, how many hours did usually work per day? 
12. Did you do 2 upwards works at the same time? Yes…1, No…2 
13. How many months did you do all kinds of paid work in the last 12 months? 
14. What is the average quantity of working days per month? 
15. What is the average quantity of working hours per day? 
16. Do you have to work in your house? (such as cleaning, shopping, cooking, 
clothes washing, fetch water and wood, repairing tools in the house,…) 
Yes…1, No…2 
17. How many hours a day in the last 12 months you did this kind of work? 
18. Have you contributed any public working days? Yes…1, No…2 
19. In the past 12 months, how many public working days without pay did you 
contribute? 
 
Section 4: Health 
 
1. In the last 12 months, has any member of your household gone to the health 
care centers? (including doctor’s visit and cases whereas he/she is not sick or 
ill but taking health check, prenatal check-up, abortion, setting a coil, paid 
vaccination,…) 
2. Name of the person used health facility 
3. Which health facility has [NAME] used? (including invited a health care 
provider to home): hamlet health center …1, commune health center…2, 
policlinic…3, government hospital…4, private health facility…5, traditional 
medical practitioner…6, other heath facility…7 
4. Did [NAME] be hospitalized then? Yes….1, No, just be an outpatient…2 
5. What is the total out-patient treatment cost of [NAME]? (including 
consultation and other expenses (feeding-up allowance, other service fees as 
requested, medicine, health tools…) related to treatment that time) 
6. What is the total in-patient treatment cost of [NAME]? (including hospital fee 
and other expenses (feeding-up allowance, other service fees as requested, 
medicine, health tools, …) related to treatment that time. 
7. In the last 12 months, how much did your household spend on buying 
medicine for self treatment or stand-by without consultation (including 
medicine and other expenses such as transportation, vehicle keeping fee,…)? 
8. In the past 12 months, how much have you spent on health tools? Example: 
stethoscope, hearing aid apparatus, sputum taking medicine, 
sphygmomanometer, medicine cabinet… 
9. In the past 12 months, how much have you contributed to health (health fund, 
construction of health centers, preventive campaigns,…)? 




Section 5: Income and other inflows of money 
 
Part 5A. Income from salary, wage 
1. Have paid job? Yes…1, No…2 
2. What is the most time consuming among the works you do to receive 
salary/wage? 
3. Has this work been mentioned in question 6 section 3? Yes…1, No…2 
4. Organization, function/product of this work? 
5. Which organization are you working for? Other household…1, government 
administration, police, military…2, communist party, social organization…3, 
state enterprise…4, other economic state sector…5, collective economic 
sector…6, private capitalist economic sector…7, private capitalist economic 
sector…7, state capitalist economic sector…8, foreign shared economic 
sector…9 
6. In the past 12 months, how much did you receive from this work in money and 
in kind? 
7. Apart from salary/wage, how much did you receive from the following items 
in cash and in kind? 
a) New Year and holidays 
b) Social subsidy (including subsidy for sickness, maternity or working accident) 
c) Domestic and overseas business trip allowance 
d) Others 
e) Total (a+b+c+d) 
8. Apart from those two works, did you do any other works for salary and wage 
in the last 12 months? Yes…1, No…2 
9. How much did you receive from these works in cash and in kind in the last 12 
months? 
10. Income from salaries and wages of other members 
 
Part 5B. Agricultural, forestry and fishery activities 
1. Are your houseshold a co-operative member? Yes…1, No…2, Do not 
know…3 
 
Part 5B1. Agricultural, syvilcultural land and aquacultural water 
2. Do  your household manage and use agricultural, sylvilcultural, and 
aquacultural land? Yes…1, No…2 
3. Which kind of the following land are your household manage and use? 
a. Agricultural land: of which land for annual crop…., land for perennial 
crop… 
b. Sylvilcultural land: of which natural forestry …., planted forestry…. 
c. Aquacultural water 
d. Unused land 
4. Area: Total……, of which used for long time…. 
5. Do  you have a land use certificate? Yes….1, No…2 
6. Whose name is written? Husband….1, Wife….2, Both…3, Single…4 
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7. In the last 12 months, did your household lend and/or use your land for rent? 
Yes…1, No…2 
8. Cash and in-kind from lending and/or using your land for rent? 
9. In the last 12 months, did your household borrow and/or rent land from others? 
Yes…1, No…2 
10. Cash and in-kind paid for borrowing and renting land of others in the last 12 
months? 
 
Part 5B2. Agriculture Production 
1. In the last 12 months, has your household harvested any agricultural products? 
Yes…1, No…2 
 
Part 5B2.1. Income from rice and other food crops 
2. Which product has your household harvested? Ordinary rice ….1, glutinous 
rice…2, specialty rice…3, Indian corn…4, sweet potatoes…5, 
cassava/manioc…6, other stable crops…7, potatoes…8, kohlrabi, cabbage, 
cauliflower…9, other leafy greens…10, tomatoes…11, water morning 
glory…12, fresh legumes (beans)…13, soybeans…14, sesame seeds…15, 
other vegetables, tubers, fruits…16 
3. What is the total cultivated area in the last 12 months? 
4. What was the harvested production in the last 12 months? 
5. Of which, how much was sold, bartered? 
6. Who did you mainly sell to and bartered with? State…1, Non-state…2 
7. What was the value of the harvested production in the last 12 months? 
 
Part 5B2.2. Income from annual and perennial industrial crops 
2. Which product has your household harvested? Soybeans…17, peanuts…18, 
sesame seeds…19, sugar cane…20, tobacco…21, cotton…22, rute, ramie…23, 
rush….24, other annual industrial crops…25, other annual crops…26, tea…27, 
coffee…28, rubber…29, black pepper…30, coconut…31, mulberry…32, 
cashew…33, other perennial industrial crops…34 
3. What is the total cultivated area in the last 12 months? 
4. What was the harvested production in the last 12 months? 
5. Of which, how much was sold, bartered? 
6. Who did you mainly sell to and barter with? State…1, Non-state…2 
7. What was the value of the harvested production in the last 12 months? 
 
Part 5B2.3. Income from fruit crops 
2. Which product has your household harvested? Oranges, limes, mandarins…35, 
pineapple…36, bananas…37, mango…38, apples…39, grapes…40, plums…41, 
papaya…42, litchi, logan, rambutan…43, sapodilla…44, custard apple…45, 
jackfruit, durian…46, mangosteen…47, other fruit trees…48, perennial crops…49, 
breeding…50, ornamental plot plant…51 
3. What is the total cultivated area in the last 12 months? 
4. What was the harvested production in the last 12 months? 
5. Of which, how much was sold, bartered? 
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6. Who did you mainly sell to and barter with? 
7. What was the value of the harvested production in the last 12 months? 
 
Part 5B2.4. Income from crop by-production 
Please tell us about products by which you used and sold in the last 12 months 
8. Straw, thatch 
9. Sweet potato leaves and stems 
10. Stems of cassava plant and maize 
11. Stems and leaves of peanuts and various types of legumes 
12. Top and leaves of sugar cane 
13. Stems of jute, ramie mulberry plants 
14. Various types of firewood (not including agro-forestry trees) 
15. Others 
 
Part 5B2.5. Agricultural production expenditure 
9. Which of the following did your household spend on to make the already 
harvested production? Seeds, tree for breeding…1, organic fertilizer…2, chemical 
fertilizer…3, pesticide…4, non-durable items…5, energy, fuel (petrol, rude oil, 
lubricant, firing,…)…6, repair, maintenance…7, depreciation of fixed assets…8, 
rent and bid for land use…9, rent asset, machinery equipment, other means of 
machines…10, plough rent…11, outside labor cost…12, irrigational cost…13, 
payment of loan interest…14, agricultural taxes…15, other costs (fee, postage, 
advertisement, marketing, production insurance contribution of funds for 
vegetation protection, soil renovation administrative management…)…16 
10. Expenditure 
17. How much has your household spent on the following crop: a) foodgrain crop; 
b) foodstuffs crop; c) industrial crop; d) fruits and others rather than forestry crop; 
e) total (a+b+c+d) 
18. Remained valued of crop for use or sales? 
 
Part 5B3. Income from livestock 
1. Has anyone in your household raised or owned cattles, poultries in the last 12 
months? Yes….1, No…2 
Part B3.1. Income from livestock 
2. Did you household make any production of the following? Water pigs…1, 
water buffalo…2, various of poultries…3, breed of cattles, poultries…4, other 
cattles, poultries (goat, sheep, bear, stag, rabbit, dog, dove,..)….5, eggs of 
poultries (chicken, duck,..)….6, fresh milk…7, silk worm cocoon….8, bee’s 
honey…9, other livestock (not be killed or slaughter)…10, livestock by-
products…11 
3. How much […] has your household sold, exchanged given as present in the last 
12 months? 
4. How much […] has your household consumed for your household in the last 
12 months? 
5. How much […] did you use for other purpose in the last 12 months? (including 
for preliminary processing, used as materials, for production,…) 
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6. Total income from livestock in the last 12 months. 
 
Part 5B3.2. Expenditure on livestock 
7. Breed of cattles, poultries 
8. Food 
9. Non-durable items 
10. Energy, fuel (electricity petrol, rude oil,…) 
11. Small repair, maintenance 
12. Depreciation of fixed assets 
13. Rent and bid for land use 
14. Rent of asset, machinery equipment, other means of production 
15. Payments for laborers 
16. Payment for medicine for cattles, poultries 
17. Payment of loan interest 
18. Turn-over tax 
19. Other expenses (fees, postage,…) 
20. Remained amount for use or sales? 
 
Part 5B4. Farm services 
1. Did any member of your household use any machines, equipment, tools for 
agricultural services in the last 12 months? (such as ploughing, farming, irrigation, 
prevention from insects, pluck rice off, preliminary treatment, other services such 
as protection, fertilization, castrate cattles, cage washing,…) Yes…1, No….2 
B4.1. Income from farm services 
2. Did your household make any income from the following activities? Farm 
work…1, irrigation…2, prevent from insect…3, pluck rice off, preliminary 
treatment…4, other services (protection, fertilization, castrate cattles, 
washing,…)….5 
3. How many months did you have income from the activities mentioned in 
question 2 in the last 12 months? 
4. What was the average monthly income? 
5. Total income 
 
Part 5B4.2. Expenses for farm services 
6. Did your household make any income from the following activities? Farm 
work…1, irrigation…2, prevent from insect…3, pluck rice off, preliminary 
treatment…4, other services (protection, fertilization, castrate cattles, washing,…) 
Expenditure on agricultural service activities in the last 12 months? 
7. Materials 
8. Non-durable items 
9. Energy, fuel (electricity petrol, rude oil,…) 
10. Small repair, maintenance 
11. Fixed assets depreciation 
12. Rent of house, workshop machineries, means of production 
13. Outside labor cost 
14. Loan interest 
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15. Turnover tax 
16. Other expenditure (fees, postage, advertisement, marketing, production, 
insurance,…) 
17. Total (7+…+16) 
 
Part 5B5. Sylviculture 
1.Did any member of your household do sylviculture activities in the last 12 
months? (including forest plantation, management, protection, growing, making 
tree for breeding) 
 
Part 5B5.1. Income from sylviculture 
2. Which of the following products did your household harvested? Mu oil 
tree…52, cinnamon…53, anise…54, pine…55, varnish tree…56, tree for 
wood…57, bamboo…58, fan palm tree…59, water coconut…60, other 
sylviculture trees…61, wood…62 
3. Value of production harvested in the last 12 months? 
4. Of which, value of production used for sales, barter 
5. In the last 12 months, how much did you earn from forest plantation, protection, 
maintaining and improving? 
6. In the last 12 months, how much did you earn from trees for breeding and other 
products collected in the forest? 
7. In the last 12 months, how much did you earn from sylviculture services 
 
Part 5B5.2. Sylviculture expenditure 
8. Which of the following expenses did your household spend? Seeds, tree for 
breeding…1, all kinds of fertilizers…2, non-durable items…3, energy, fuel 
(petrol, rude oil, lubricant, firing,…)…4, repair, maintenance…5, depreciation of 
fixed assets…6, rent and bid for land use…7, rent asset, machinery equipment, 
other means of machines…8, plough rent…9, outside labor cost…10, payment of 
loan interest…11, agricultural taxes…12, other cost (fees, post, 
advertisement)…13 
9. Value 
10. Remained amount of forestry production for use and sales 
11. Did your household make any income from hunting down, trapping, 
domesticating forestry animals in the last 12 months? Yes…1, No…2 
12. How much money did your household make from hunting down, trapping, 
domesticating forestry animals? 
13. How much money did your household spend on hunting down, trapping, 
domesticating forestry animals? 
 
Part 5B6. Aquaculture 
1. Has anyone in your household raised or caught aquaculture products in the last 
12 months? (including growing shrimp, breeding fish and other products, catching 




Part 5B6.1. Income from aquaculture 
2. Which product has your household harvested? Aquaculture raising (fish, 
shrimp, shrimp and fish breedings, other water products)…1, aquaculture catching 
(fish, shrimp, other water products, receiving from other water product 
service)…2 
3. How much […] has your household sold, used for payment, exchanged, given 
as present in the last 12 months? 
4. How much […] has your household consumed for your household in the last 12 
months? 
5. How much […] did you use for other purpose in the last 12 months? (including 
for preliminary processing, used as materials, for production,…) 
6. Total income from livestock in the last 12 months 
 
Part 5B6.2. Expenditure on planting and growing aquacultural products 
Please provide us with information on your expenditure on livestock that your 
household has raised in the last 12 months? (including all kinds of expenses on 
purchase, barter, receive,…) 
7. Breed of raising, catching, service 
8. Foods 
9. Non-durable items 
10. Energy, fuel (electricity, petrol, rude oil,…) 
11. Small repair, maintenance 
12. Depreciation of fixed assets 
13. Rent and bid for land use 
14. Rent of asset, machinery equipment, other means of production 
15. Payment for laborers 
16. Payment for medicine for aquacultural products 
17. Payment of loan interest 
18. Turn-over tax 
19. Other expenses (fees, postage,…) 
20. Total expenditure (7+…+19) 
21. Remained amount of aquacultural production for use and sales? 
 
Part 5C. Non-farm, non-forestry and non-aquaculture businesses; farm, forestry and 
aquaculture product processing 
1. In the last 12 months, did your household do any non-farm, non-forestry and 
non-aquaculture businesses? Yes…1, No…2 
 
Part 5C.1. Income from non-farm, non-forestry and non-aquaculture businesses; farm, 
forestry and aquaculture product processing 
2. Please provide us with detailed information on these activities 
3. Person who knows most information 
4. How many months did this activity in operation? 
5. What is the average monthly turnover of selling goods and services? 
6. Turnover 
7. Was there any product which you consumed in the last 12 months? 
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8. What was the value of the consumed product? 
9. Total 
10. Did you have business license for this kind of activity? 
 
Part 5C.2. Expenditure for non-farm, non-forestry and non-aquaculture businesses; 
farm, forestry and aquaculture product processing 
Could you please provide information on your expenditure for non-farm, non-forestry 
and non-aquaculture businesses in the last 12 months? (including for self, buying, 
bartering, being given,…) 
11. Material sub-material? 
12. Non-durable things? 
13. Electricity, petrol, oil, fuel, water,…? 
14. Small repair, maintenance 
15. Fixed assets depreciation 
16. Rent of factory, workshop, machine, or other tools? 
17. Labor cost for outside? 
18. Loan interest? 
19. Turnover tax, fee for business registration 
20. Other expenses? (postage, travel, advert, marketing, sample buying, surveying, 
products insurance) 
21. Total expenditure (11+…+22) 
22. Total value of remained products kept for use and sales 
 
Part 5D. Other sources of income 
 
Part 5D.1. Other incoming money which is considered as income 
1. Has anyone in your household received money or inking from the following 
source? (Remittance and value of in-kind presents from overseas…101, domestic 
remittance and value of in-kind presents…102, pension, sickness and one-time job 
loss allowance…103, social insurance allowance…104, other income from social 
insurance…105, interest of savings, shares, coupon, loans…106, income from 
workshop, machinery, assets, tool….107, others (lottery, charity, and support from 
other organizations)…108) Yes…1, No…2. If yes, go to questions 2. 
2. What was the value during the last 12 months?  
 
Part 5D.2. Other incoming money which is not considered as income 
1. Has anyone in your household received money or inking from the following 
source? (selling machine, equipment, workshop, house, tools, right of land 
ownership transfer…201; selling gold, silver, precious stone, jewelry…202; 
withdrawal from savings, stocks,…203; borrowing on interest, advance 
payment…204; others…205) Yes…1, No…2. If yes, go to question 2. 






Section 6: Expenditure 
 
Section 6. Part A. Expenditure on food and drinks 
 
Part 6A1. Expenditure on food and drinks during holidays 
1. Which of the following things did you consume during the holidays in the last 
12 months? Fragrant, special rice…101, glutinous rice…102, pork…110, 
beef…111, buff…112, buffalo’s meat…113, duck and other cattle meat…114, 
other meat (goat, dog, lamb, game meat, bird…)…115, processed meat (pork pies, 
roasted meat, sausage,…)…116, fresh fish, shrimp…118, other seafoods (crab, 
snails,…)…120, chicken or duck eggs…121, beans..124, fruit…134, sugar, 
molasses…139, cakes, candy, candied fruits…141, alcohol, beer…145, 
beverages…146, canned or bottled refreshment…147, coffee…150, tea…151, 
cigarettes, tobacco with water pipe…155, outdoors eating…157, other things 
(processed foods, extra foods, spice,…)…158. If yes to question 1, go to question 
2 and 3. 
2. Value and Quantity bought or bartered 
3. Value and Quantity self-made or received 
 
Part 6A2. Daily expenditure on food and drink 
1. In the last 12 months, apart from holidays’ time, which of the following did you 
consume? Fragrant, special rice…101, glutinous rice…102, corn/maize (weight of 
kernels)…103, cassava (fresh equivalent)…104, sweet and ordinary potatoes 
(fresh equivalent)…105, bread, wheat or wheat flour…106, noodle, instant 
noodle, instant rice soup…107, wheat/egg noodle (dry)…108, fresh rice 
noodles…109, arrow root noodles…110, pork meat (inedible part removed)… 
111, beef and buffalo meat (inedible part removed)…112, chicken…113, duck 
and other poultry…114, other meats (goat, lamb, game meats, birds,…)…115, 
processed meat…116, grease, oil…117, fresh fish, shrimp…118, dried and 
processed fish and shrimp…119, other sea foods (crab, snails,…)…120, chicken 
and duck eggs…121, tofu…122, peanuts, sesame seeds…123, beans…124, 
various kinds of fresh pea…125, water morning glory…126, kohlrabi…127, 
cabbage…128, tomatoes…129, other vegetables (calabash, pumpkin, 
cucumber,…)…130, oranges…131, bananas…132, mangoes…133, other fruit 
(rambutan, papaya, melon,…)…134, fish sauce and dipping sauce…135, 
salt…136, spices, condensed soup…137, seasoning, spice…138, sugar, 
molasses…139, chewing gum…140, cakes, candy, candied fruits…141, 
condensed milk, powder milk…142, cream, yoghurt…143, fresh milk…144, 
alcohol, beer…145, beverages…146, bottled and canned refreshment…147, fruit 
juice, bottled, canned without gas fruit juice…148, bottled and canned purified 
water…149, bottled and canned tonic water…150, instant coffee…151, powder 
coffee…152, powder tea/instant tea…153, cigarettes, tobacco with a water 
pipe…154, betel leaf, areca nut, lime…155, betel and areca…156, outdoors meal 
(breakfast, lunch, dinner)…157, others…158 . If yes to question 1, go to question 
2 to 10. 
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2. In the last 12 months, apart from holidays’ time, did your household buy or 
barter anything mentioned in question 1? 
3. How many times each month (average) in the last 12 months? 
4. What was the average amount you bought or bartered each time? 
5. What was the value each time? 
6. Value you did buy in the last 12 month. 
7. In the last 12 months, did your household consume the self-made or given 
things? 
8. How many months you did you consume? 
9. Total quantity of self-made or given things did your household consume in 
these months? 
10. What was the total value did your household consume? 
 
Part 6B. Expenditure on non-food and non-drink and other expenditure 
 
Part 6B1. Expenditure on daily consumption  
1. In the last 12 months, apart from holidays’ time, which of following did you 
consume? Pocket money for children…201, coal, wood, sawdust, chaff…202, 
gas…203, kerosene for cooking or light…204, gasoline, lubricant and grease for 
motor vehicles (car, motorcycle)…205, bicycle, motorcycle or car tending…206, 
matches, candles, flint…207, washing powder softening liquid…208, disk 
washing liquid, house cleaning liquid…209, shampoo, conditioning…210, bath 
soap, liquid…211, lotion, powder and lipsticks…212, toothpaste, tooth 
brush…213, toilet paper, razorblades…214, books, newspaper, magazines…215, 
flowers…216, entertainment (cinema, video, sports)…217, lottery tickets…218, 
regular worship…219, haircut, hairdressing…220, other daily expenses…221. If 
yes to question 1, go to question 2 to 5. 
2. How many months did you buy in the last 12 months? 
3. How much did you buy each month? 
4. How much did you buy in the last 12 months? 
5. How much did you self make in these months? 
 
Part 6B2. Annual expenditure 
1. In the last 12 month, which of the following did your household consume? 
Fabric…301, ready-made clothing (incl. underwear)…302, mosquito net and 
netting…303, face towel, scarves…304, rush mats, blankets, pillows…305, other 
sewing materials and garments (needles, thread, sock)…306, tailoring or laundry 
service…307, shoes, sandals, wooden clogs…308, nylon sheeting, hats, 
umbrellas…309, light bulbs, electric wire, plugs, fuse…310, porcelain and glass 
bowls, plates, teapots and cups…311, pans, pots, bins, buckets, basins…312, 
vacuum thermos and liner…313, bags and baskets…314, lighter, flashlight, 
battery…315, cradle, hammock, pram…316, other household items (exclude 
durable goods)…317, bike tires, tubes, bicycle spare parts…318, motorbike, car 
tires, tubes, motorcycle, car spare parts…319, maintenance and repair of living 
tools…320, boat, bus, train, taxi, transportation fees…321, pictures, photos, 
houseplants…322, sport instruments…323, toys…324, envelopes, stamps, 
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telephone, postage…325, internet…326, cosmetic surgery, body building…327, 
excursion, holidays…328, jewelry, watch, makeup…329, other cultural 
activities…330, hiring domestic services…331, other annual expenses…332. If 
yes to question 1, go to question 2 and 3. 
2. Value of purchase in the last 12 months. 
3. Value of self make in the last 12 months. 
 
Part 6B3. Other expenses included in expenditure 
1. In the last 12 month, which of the following did your household spend on? 
Contributions to various funds (fund for natural relief, cooperation fund, poverty 
fund, education enhancement fund…)…401, public labor contribution…402, all 
kinds of taxes (excl. production tax)…403, wedding…404, funeral and worship on 
special occasions of members of the household…405, arrange parties (to celebrate 
birthday, completion, reception…)…406, give, donate, support (cash and 
inkind)…407, other expenses…408. If yes to question 1, go to question 2. 
2. Value of purchase, self make in the last 12 months. 
 
Part 6B4. Other expenses not included in expenditure 
1. In the last 12 month, which of the following did your household spend on? 
Lend money, pay debt, return advance (incl. payment for interest)…501, 
contribute to revolving credit group, buying shares, certificate and stock…502, 
purchase of gold, silver, specious stone, foreign currency for saving 
purpose…503, saving account…504, life, security insurance…505, other 
insurance (excl. life, security, health insurance)…506, outstanding investment 
(housing, incomplete production workshop…507, other expenditure 
(specify________)…508. If yes to question 1, go to question 2. 
2. Value of purchase, self make in the last 12 months. 
 
Section 7: Fixed assets and durable things 
 
1. Kindly let us know what kind of following things do you have? Perennial crops 
garden…1, aquaculture production area…2, other production land area…3, 
buffalo, cow, horse for production and breeding…4, breeding male and female 
pig…5, basic poultry, cattle…6, breeding facilities…7, feed grinding machine…8, 
rice milling machine…9, rice pulling off machine…10, pesticide spurring 
machine…11, rice cooling box…12, workshop…13, shop…14, other production 
base…15, car…16, pulling machine…17, trailer…18, a plough…19, 
motorbike…20, bicycle…21, wagon…22, motor boat, ferry…23, boat, ferry 
without motor…24, other means of transportation…25, lathe, welding, cutting 
machine…26, sewing, casting machine…27, wooden sewing machine…28, 
pumping machine…29, power generator…30, printer, photocopy machine…31, 
fax machine…32, telephone…33, sewing, weaving, embroider…34, other 
machine and equipment…35, fishing net…36, goods keeping things…37, other 
professional equipment…38, video…39, color T.V….40, black white T.V….41, 
sound system…42, radio/cassettes…43, recorder…44, computer…45, camera, 
video…46, refrigerator, freezer…47, air-conditioner…48, washing, drying 
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machine…49, electric fan…50, water heating machine in the bathroom…51, gas 
cook…52, electric cook, rice pan, airpressure pan…53, troller (various 
kinds)…54, wardrobe (various kinds)…55, bed…56, chair, table, sofa…57, 
vacuum cleaner, exsisccate…58, other valuable things (antique, piano, organ, 
dressing table)…59. 
2. Name of assets, durable things 
3. When did your household buy/receive? 
4. What was the value when you bought/received? 
5. What is the current value?  
6. What is the using purpose? 
7. What is the time proportion for production and living in the last 12 months? 
 
Section 8: Housing 
 
Pls. provide us with some information on your housing. 
1. How many houses/flats are you living in? 
2. What is the total living area? 
Including bedrooms, dining room, sitting room, learning rooms, playing room 
Excluding bathrooms, toilets, kitchens, stores, business rooms 
3. What type of your household’s main dwelling? A city house surrounded by a 
garden…1, permanent house or apartment with private bath/kitchen/toilet…2, 
permanent one-story house or apartment with separate bath/kitchen/toilet…3, 
semi-permanent house…4, temporary house…5. 
4. How long have you been living in this house? 
5. What type of house did you use to live before? A city house surrounded by a 
garden…1, permanent house or apartment with private bath/kitchen/toilet…2, 
permanent one-story house or apartment with separate bath/kitchen/toilet…3, 
semi-permanent house…4, temporary house…5. 
6. Where did you live before? In this place…1, other place but in the same 
ward/commune…2, in other ward/commune, but in the same province/city…3, in 
other city/province…4 . 
7. Does this house/apartment belong to you? Yes, totally…1, yes, partly…2, 
no…3. 
8. Do you have to pay for house rent? Yes…1, No…2.  
9. Who do you pay rent mainly for? Government…1, relatives…2, private 
landlord…3, other (specify_____________)…4 . 
10. How much did you pay rent for your dwelling in the last 12 months? (in cash 
and in kind) 
11. What is the current price of your dwelling? 
12. Apart from this dwelling, do you have any other landlot or house/flat? Yes…1, 
No…2.  
13. Do you have any income from renting this landlot or house/flat? Yes…1, 
No…2. 14. How much did you earn for renting this landlot or house/flat in the last 
12 months? (in kind and cash) 
15. What is the current price of this landlot or house/flat? 
16. Is there any land or house/flat did you buy? Yes…1, No…2. 
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17. When was the last time of purchase? 
18. Do you have any newly built house/flat completed in the last 12 months? 
Yes…1, No…2. 
19. What were the expenses for construction from starting to completion? 
20. Expenses in the last 12 months for that construction. 
21. What were the expenses on big reparation, renovation, improvement of your 
house/land in the last 12 months? (write 0 if no expenses) 
22. What were the expenses on small repair in the last 12 months (incl. 
painting…)? 
(write 0 if no expenses) 
23. What is the main source of your drinking water? Individual tap…1, public 
tap…2, bought water (in tank, bottled or in a jar)…3, deep drill well with 
pump…4, hand dug well, constructed well…5, filtered spring water…6, deep 
well…7, rain water…8, river, lake, pond…9, other 
(specify______________)…10. 
24. Do your household use purifying tank or mechanical to purify this drinking 
water? Yes…1, No…2. 
25. Do you have to pay for this water? Yes…1, No…2. 
26. How much did you have to pay for this drinking water in the last 12 months? 
27. What type of toilet does your household have? Flush toilet with septic 
tank/sewage pipes…1, suilabh…2, double vault compost latrine…3, toilet directly 
over the water…4, other…5, no toilet…6. 
27a. What is the toilet cover made of? Clay, clay brick…1, covered with 
cement…2, paved with enameled tiles…3, other (specify____________)…4. 
28. What is your main source of lighting? Electricity…1, battery lamp, resin 
torch…2, gas, oil, kerosene lamp…3, other (specify___________)…4. 
29. Did you have to pay for living electricity in the last 12 months? Yes…1, 
No…2. 
30. How much did you pay for electricity used for living purpose in the last 12 
months? 
31. How did your household dispose garbage in the last 12 months? Collected…1, 
dumped in river/lake…2, dumped in a side nearby…3, other 
(specify__________)…4. 
32. Do you have to pay for garbage disposal? Yes…1, No…2. 
33. How much did you pay for garbage disposal? 
33a. Sum of expenses on housing, electricity, water . 
34. Do you have a TV? Yes…1, No…2. 
35. What channels can you receive? VTV1…1, VTV2…2, VTV3…3, Cable…4, 
home city…5, other city…6, others…7. 
36. Which channel do you usually watch? 
37. What time do your household usually watch TV? Before 8 a.m….1, 8-<11 
p.m….2, 11-<14 p.m….3, 14-<17 p.m….4, 17-<19 p.m….5, 19-<21 p.m….6, 
after 21 p.m….7. 
38. What are the most favorite 3 TV channels in your household? News…1, 
film…2, music…3, sport…4, quiz…5, wild life…6, teenagers…7, other 
(specify__________)…8. 
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39. Do you have a radio? Yes…1, No…2.  
40. What channel can your radio receive? TNVN channel am…1, TNVN channel 
pm…2, home city…3, other city…4, others…5. 
41. What channels does your household usually listen to? 
42. What time does your household listen to radio? Before 8 a.m….1, 8-<11 
p.m….2, 11-<14 p.m….3, 14-<17 p.m….4, 17-<19 p.m….5, 19-<21 p.m….6, 
after 21 p.m….7. 
43. What are the most favorite 3 radio channels in your household? News…1, 
people’s army…2, music…3, telling story…4, program for teenagers…5, arts…6, 
other (specify__________)…7. 
44. Which newspapers, magazine can you buy or borrow in the commune/ward? 
People…1, labor…2, women…3, army…4, police…5, sports…6, legal…7, 
pioneer…8, youth…9, life and science…10, world security…11, teenagers…12, 
children…13, arts…14, union…15, communist…16, knowledge…17, 
fashion…18, funny youth…19, pupil’s flower…20, family and society…21, life 
and health…22, market…23, buy and sell…24, home city…27, other cities…28, 
others…29. 
45. What are the three newspapers which your household usually read (including 
ones you buy and borrow)? 
46. Do your household have a computer? Yes…1, No…2. 
47. Are you linked to Internet? Yes…1, No…2. 
 
Section 9: Participation in poverty alleviation programs 
 
1. Are you a family of invalids, sick war veterans, martyr, Vietnamese heroic 
mothers? Yes…1, No…2. 
2. Are you a family of lonely elderly, disabled who receive regular social subsidy? 
Yes…1, No…2. 
3. Are you classified as a poor or very poor household by the commune 
authorities? Yes, poor household…1, yes, very poor household…2, don’t 
know…3, no…4. 
4. In the last 12 months, has any household member been provided with free 
health insurance? Yes…1, No…2. 
5. In the last 12 months, has your household been provided with poor household 
certificate by the commune authorities? Yes…1, No…2. 
6. In the last 12 months, has any household member used the poor household 
Certificate for Health consultation, treatment and were exempted from or gotten 
any fee reduction? Yes, got fee exemption, reduction…1, yes, did not get any fee 
exemption, reduction…2, no…3. 
7. In the last 12 months, did you receive any assistance from the State mass 
organization, associations to repair, construct dwelling? Yes…1, No…2. 
8. What was the value of assistance? 
9. Were you exempted from agricultural land use tax in the year 2001? Yes…1, 
No…2. 
10. Were you exempted from agricultural land use tax in the year 2001? 
Commune authorities have not implemented…1, do not know…2. 
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11. Have you ever been provided with loan in the last 12 months? Yes…1, No…2. 
12. What is the source of your loan? Bank for the poor…1, bank for agriculture 
and rural development…2, other banks…3, national employment funds…4, mass 
credit associations…5, socio-political organizations…6, private…7, relatives, 
friends…8. 
13. What is the value of loan in the last 12 months? 
14. What is the term of the loan? 
15. What is the interest?  
 
Source: General Statistics of Vietnam 
